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Some say the world will end in fire, Some say in ice . . . .And
[either] would suffice.
1
—Robert Frost
ABSTRACT
Fire and ice will forge the future of the world. The constitutional
battle in the United States vis-à-vis global warming will determine the
future of fire and ice. The electric sector of the economy holds the key;
a fundamental transition to renewable energy is necessary to create a
sustainable economy and abate global warming. As of 2009, ten U.S.
states are vigorously moving toward implementing a feed-in tariff
regulatory mechanism similar to those adopted previously by eighteen
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of the European Kyoto Protocol countries to shift to renewable power
technologies. However, these feed-in tariffs could be found to violate
the U.S. Constitution and plunge policy over an immovable legal cliff.
This article outlines how twenty-seven U.S. states and five European
Kyoto Protocol countries employ the constitutionally defensible
alternative policy of renewable portfolio standards.
Effectively reducing mounting annual carbon emissions is a
profound global challenge. This article compares and contrasts the
legality of the two primary means that states use to promote alternative
renewable energy technologies so as to minimize carbon emissions:
feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards. These methods are
analyzed against the Supremacy Clause requirements of the
Constitution to determine which could violate existing U.S. law,
dooming renewable energy and carbon control efforts. This analysis
examines the policy options, their implementation, and what will and
will not pass legal challenges.
For a global push against global warming, the ends must not
legally be confused with the means. The common goals of reducing the
concentration of greenhouse gases cannot be implemented with the
same tools under the separate legal systems of the United States and
Europe. Getting legal policy right is imperative so that the transition to
sustainable development proceeds smoothly and expeditiously and is
not stalled in a protracted constitutional challenge.
I.

FIRE AND ICE: WHEN RENEWABLES GO LEGALLY RIGHT AND
WRONG

We are on the verge of world calamity by fire and ice. The “fire”
is climate warming, cranking up the global thermostat to the tipping
point of catastrophe. The “ice” is the melting of the polar ice caps—
which contain more than ninety percent of the world’s fresh water—
in this global flame. Once melted, that fresh water is lost in the ocean
brine. As set forth below, the solution must be rapid deployment of
renewable resources in lieu of carbon-rich fuels.
However, there is a schism between the needed expedited
transition to renewable resources and the requirements of the U.S.
Constitution. The attempt by U.S. states to copy the European model
of feed-in tariffs to promote renewable power is running afoul of U.S.
constitutional requirements. The ten states now launching feed-in
tariffs will face the stern hand of the Constitution, which could set
back their efforts. The legal gauntlet has already been thrown: In the
past year, the first legal challenge to both state Renewable Portfolio

Ferrey_final_cpcxns.doc

Winter 2010

FIRE AND ICE: WORLD RENEWABLE ENERGY

2/22/2010 9:33:43 AM

127

Standards (RPSs) and to state regulation of carbon emissions from
power plants has been filed.
This article examines U.S. efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, the requirements of law, and the looming legal
confrontation between state efforts and the Constitution. Because
carbon control is important and urgent, this article suggests
alternatives to feed-in tariffs, including RPSs, that escape these legal
traps. It examines those legal impediments and charts routes around
them to promote renewable power in the United States. It traces
legal alternatives to promote rapid deployment of renewable
resources in the United States, which may help prevent the world
from ending in fire or ice.
A. The Constitutional Backstop
For the past two centuries, the Constitution has limited both
good ideas and bad. Even in the interests of abating global warming
and promoting renewable energy, the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution remains a legal backstop that may become a barrier. In
a federalist system, what the states may do is limited by the
Constitution. European nations’ penchant for having utilities pay
more for renewable power through feed-in tariffs would run afoul of
precedent interpreting energy and environmental regulations
permissible under the Constitution. How the United States and
Europe can attack global warming marks a major legal divide.
Nonetheless, ten states in the United States are now considering
the adoption of European-style feed-in tariffs to force electric utilities
to pay more for renewable power than for conventional power. This
is likely to invoke a confrontation over the Supremacy Clause that
will imperil such renewable power initiatives. These constitutional
limitations cannot be overcome by passing a state statute. The
Constitution remains the ultimate law of the land, and its Supremacy
Clause embodies an essential element of the United States’ legal
construct. A European-style feed-in tariff could be implemented in
the United States only via amendments to the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) and the Federal Power Act (FPA).
In the past year, both state RPSs and state regulation of carbon
emissions from power plants have been challenged in court.
This article is the first to examine the legal problems with U.S.
states’ attempts to graft the European system of renewable energy
subsidies onto the U.S. system. Section I.B, immediately below, sets
forth the fundamental relationship between the conventional
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production of electricity and the global threat of GHG-fostered
global warming. Section II sets forth the ability of abundant
renewable energy resources to abate global warming.
Section III explores regulatory mechanisms for promotion of
renewable resources in the United States, including federal tax
credits, state system benefit charges, and federal PURPA renewable
energy purchase requirements. Section IV goes further, analyzing
newly burgeoning state RPSs—now employed in more than half the
U.S. states and several European nations, including Sweden, Italy,
and the U.K.—and their variations and potentials to promote
renewable resources. These RPS programs are the major renewable
power incentives used in the U.S. and promise to be addressed in
future federal legislation. Section V analyzes the constitutional issues
with RPSs, including the Commerce Clause limitations on states and
ownership issues.
Section VI introduces European feed-in tariffs, pending feed-in
tariff programs in ten U.S. states, and the constitutional barriers to
adoption of these programs. Good policy does not always equate
with passing legal muster. Key federal court and federal agency
decisions interpreting these issues are analyzed. Finally, the “bright
line” rearticulated in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision is
examined.
Good ideas—even for renewable power and the abatement of
global warming—must be consistent with federal law and the
Constitution. Sometimes even good ideas regarding global warming
policy are not permissible in the U.S. legal system. The legal systems
of European nations and the United States are distinct. What is
acceptable in one does not always seamlessly translate legally to the
other. Fortunately, the array of other incentives available in the U.S.
system, particularly the RPS system now adopted in half the states,
remains a legally viable alternative for renewable energy and
reduction of GHGs. This article examines all of the legal and policy
issues surrounding global warming and renewable energy solutions.
We start with the role of electric power in the carbon mix and the
emission of GHGs.
B. The Electric Sector and the Solution for Greenhouse Gases
Throughout history, human activities have been both constrained
and enhanced by the Earth’s climate. Modern human activities also
have the power to change the Earth’s climate. As early as 1896,
Arrhenius found that carbon dioxide (CO2) can affect the climate,
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and by 1938, English engineer G.S. Callendar recognized that
2
increases in atmospheric CO2 were causing a warming trend. Since
the Industrial Revolution, emissions resulting from combusting fossil
fuels for mechanical and electrical energy have poured into the
3
atmosphere.
In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
was established to study the complex interrelation between human
4
activities and climate. The IPCC’s work appeared on the world
media radar in 1995 when its second assessment report found
evidence suggesting “that there is a discernible human influence on
5
global climate.” Since 1995 we have seen many of the warmest years
6
on record and dramatic increases in storm intensity and damage.
The effects of dramatic climate change are both numerous and
dangerous, including: increased frequency of heat waves and extreme
heat events; more intense precipitation events; increased droughts,
floods, and monsoons; increased intensity of mid-latitude storms;
increased range of tropical disease vectors; and dramatic species
7
extinction events.
In 2007, the IPCC issued its summary report on the effects of
global warming, which noted particular impacts on water resources,
8
food production, ecosystems, and human health.
A possible
temperature rise of 3°C would leave up to thirty percent of species
9
facing extinction and would decimate the marine coral population.
Food production and crop yields are likely to decrease in lower
10
latitude areas, even if the global temperature increase is small. Crop
yields are likely to increase in higher latitudes, even if the

2. Stephen Schneider, An Overview of the Climate Change Problem (Feb. 2005) http://
stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Climate/ClimateFrameset.html.
3. PEW CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101 at 1 (2007), http://
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate101-Complete-Jan09.pdf.
4. See id.
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT:
CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (1995).
6. See PEW CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3, at 2.
7. See Stephen H. Schneider & Janica Lane, An Overview of “Dangerous” Climate
Change, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2006), available at http://
stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/Schneider-lane.pdf.
8. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) available at http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/ar4.html.
9. Id. at 792.
10. Id. at 790.
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temperature increase is between 1° and 3°C. Higher temperatures
will also increase the concentration of ground-level ozone, leading to
more rapid spread of infectious diseases. Forests will be increasingly
affected by pests, disease, and fire, with extended periods of high fire
12
risks and large increases in burned areas. Sea level will rise and
13
coasts will experience more storm surges. A top official with the
IPCC has indicated that developed nations will need to slash CO2
emissions by 80% to 95% by 2050 to hold GHGs to 450 parts per
14
million in the atmosphere.
At the height of the last Ice Age, temperatures were only 5°C
15
cooler than now. Therefore, an increase of the magnitude predicted
by the IPCC would be a major move. “Eleven of the past twelve years
16
GHG
have been among the warmest dozen years on record”.
st
17
emissions in the 21 century are mainly a result of power generation.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reports that
approximately forty percent of aggregate U.S. carbon emissions
contributing to climate change are related to coal-fired power
18
generation. The single-point nature of power plant emissions, and
the exploding demand for electricity, make electricity-generating
plants a logical choice for the regulation of GHG emissions in the
United States.
Carbon dioxide is the primary GHG emitted by human activities
in the United States, representing approximately 83.9% of total GHG
19
emissions. “The largest source of CO2, and of overall greenhouse
20
gas emissions, is fossil fuel combustion.” Thirty-six percent of that
fossil fuel consumption, and in turn roughly forty percent of the CO2

11. Id. at 791–92.
12. Id. at 228–29.
13. Id. at 792.
14. Mitchell, Rick, IPCC Official Says Industrialized Nations Must Cut Emissions up to 95
Percent, 39 ENV’T REP. 1917, 1917 (2008).
15. See J.R. PETIT ET AL., VOSTOK ICE CORE DATA FOR 420,000 YEARS (2001) available at
http://imap.aims.ac.za/~irina/deutVostok.txt.
16. Sun in the Clear Over Global Warming, COSMOS, July 12, 2007, http://
www.cosmosmagazine.com/news/1451/sun-clear-over-global-warming?page=1.
17. For detailed coverage of the power industry law and regulation, see generally STEVEN
FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER (West Group 2008) (1989).
18. Steven Ferrey, Corporate Responsibility and Carbon-Based Life Forms, 35 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 385, 451 (2008).
19. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS: 1990-2005 at ES-4 (2007).
20. Id.
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21

from fossil fuel combustion, is from electricity generators.
“[E]lectricity generators rely on coal for over half of their total energy
22
requirements.” Therefore, any successful GHG emission reduction
plan will rely on reduction from the electricity sector.
II. THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
ALTERNATIVES IN THE POWER EQUATION
One of the primary tools in combating increases in GHG
emissions from electricity production is to increasing the use of
renewable energy resources, many of which have zero net CO2
emissions, to replace the use of fossil fuel sources for electricity.
Even some leaders of the oil industry suggest that fifty percent of
total global energy demand could be met by solar, wind, and other
23
renewable resources by 2050.
In addition to environmental and
climate benefits, a renewable energy economy would have national
security benefits by reducing importation of fuels, as well as reducing
24
the vulnerability of the electricity grid to terrorist attack.
Solar energy is the source of all energy on earth, creating wind
25
and water movement and ultimately creating plants, biomass, and
animals, which become fossil fuels when their organic matter decays.
2
The surface of the sun emits about 1300 W/m in the direction of the
Earth. One-third of the energy reaching the Earth is reflected back
2
into space by the Earth’s atmosphere, yielding as much as 1000 W/m
at the surface of the Earth at noon on a cloudless day. On average,
2
over the hours of a year, about 170 W/m of solar radiation reach the
2
26
Earth’s oceans, and about 180 W/m reach the land surfaces.

21. Id. at ES-7.
22. Id. at ES-8.
23. See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE HYDROGEN ECONOMY: THE CREATION OF THE
WORLDWIDE ENERGY WEB AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF POWER ON EARTH 189 (2002).
24. See ROSS GELBSPAN, BOILING POINT 176 (2004).
25. Plants are a significant source of energy. Photosynthesis is an endothermic reaction
requiring 2.8 MJ of solar radiation to synthesize one molecule of glucose from six molecules of
CO2 and H2O. VACLAV SMIL, ENERGIES: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE BIOSPHERE AND
CIVILIZATION 42 (1999). Most of the terrestrial phytomass productivity in storage is in large
trees in forests; phytoplankton species in the oceans store this mass in the hydrologic cycle. Id.
at 46–48. Phytoplankton productions are 65-80% of the terrestrial phytomass total, but
phytoplankton has a life span of only one to five days. Id. at 48. The most voluminous trees are
the most massive life forms on earth, with the most phytomass, and are even larger than blue
whales in mass. Id. at 51.
24
26. Id. at 5. This results in total solar radiation annually of 2.7 x 10 joules. Id. at 6. This
amount of energy reaching the earth in the form of solar radiation is about 8,000 times more
than worldwide consumption of fossil fuels and electricity during the early 1990s. Id.
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“Human capture of this energy is neither efficient nor
prodigious. Energy used by humankind on the Earth equals only
27
[about] 0.01% of the total solar energy reaching the Earth.” Wind
power’s global energy potential is thirty five times greater than world
28
Every seventy minutes, solar energy provides as
electricity use.
29
much potential energy as humankind uses each year.
In fact, no nation on Earth uses more energy than the energy
content contained in the sunlight that strikes its existing buildings
every day. The solar energy that falls on roads in the United States
each year contains roughly as much energy content as all the fossil
fuel consumed in the world during that same year.
Unlike finite fossil fuels, solar energy represents a constantly
replenished flow, rather than an existing stock that is diminished by
its use. Tomorrow, the earth will have exactly as much solar energy
as it has today, regardless of how much solar energy is used and
consumed each day. By contrast, burning a barrel of oil or a cubic
meter of natural gas diminishes permanently that quantity of fossil
30
fuels for the next day and for future generations.

Many renewable energy projects, other than those using biomass
fuels, do not involve combustion. “They create mechanical shaft
power from the movement of wind or water, tap naturally produced
geologic steam, or employ solar energy to induce direct current on a
31
chemical surface.” “Because renewable energy alternatives – solar,
wind, hydro, geothermal – do not involve combustion to produce
electric energy, they do not emit various criteria pollutants or GHGs
32
during their operation.”
Only location limits solar, wind, and geothermal resources. [While]
fossil fuel fired plants can be sited anywhere with appropriate fuel
delivery and electricity transmission infrastructure, large renewable
power plants can only be sited where renewable sources are present
in large enough amounts and concentrations to make the capital
investment in generation facilities feasible. But unlike fossil-fuelfired generation facilities, renewable energy resources are not
33
limited by a finite fuel supply.

27. STEVEN FERREY & ANIL CABRAAL, RENEWABLE POWER IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: WINNING THE WAR ON GLOBAL WARMING 36 (2006).
28. Amory B. Lovins et al., Forget Nuclear, 24 ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. SOLUTIONS 1, 25
(2008), available at http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Newsletter/NLRMIspring08.pdf.
29. Id.
30. FERREY & CABRAAL, supra note 27, at 36.
31. Steven Ferrey, Why Electricity Matters, Developing Nations Matter, and Asia Matters
Most of All, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 113, 134 (2007).
32. Id.
33. FERREY & CABRAAL, supra note 27, at 37.
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What can be critical for renewable resources is adequate
transmission capacity from the power generation source to
34
consumers. “Electric T&D [transmission and distribution] facilities,
telecommunications equipment, and oil and gas pipelines have long
35
lives.” “Like a highway grid, once configured, locational and use
patterns that grow up around that grid make it more difficult to
36
reroute those electric highways.”
Renewable technologies must go to the place where they can be
exploited. Only in certain locations is the wind regime sufficient to
turn large wind turbines; hydro power is limited to moving water
courses; solar photovoltaic power, while ubiquitous, requires a
large land or surface area to produce the equivalent amount of
power as a large fossil fuel-fired facility (solar power is much less
dense than fossil fuels – although solar collectors can be mounted
on [sic] roofs or walls, or have dual uses, e.g., functioning as both a
37
roof and electricity generator).

According to a 2007 report from the United Nations
Environment Programme, investment capital flowing into renewable
energy worldwide climbed from $80 billion in 2005 to $100 billion in
2006.
Despite the emergence of, and attention to, renewable energy
sources . . . , forecasters do not see the international mix of power
generation sources changing appreciably over the next several
decades . . . . [T]he percentage of fossil fuels in the mix—and thus
the potential sources of GHGs in the electric power sector—are
forecasted to remain relatively constant. The International Energy
Agency in Paris forecasts that by 2030, world demand for energy
will grow by 59% and fossil fuel sources will still supply 82% of the
total, with non-carbon renewable energy sources supplying only
38
6%.

In response to this growing awareness, and due to the lack of
United States federal regulations relating to climate change and
renewable energy, states are developing their own aggressive
39
incentives for renewable energy production.
Solar photovoltaic panels are most likely to generate power
during peak times of the day when summer air conditioning demand
is greatest. According to one source, a few hundred additional
34. FERREY, supra note 17, § 2:11.
35. FERREY & CABRAAL, supra note 27, at 23.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 23–24.
38. Steven Ferrey, Power Paradox: The Algorithm of Carbon and International
Development, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 510, 518 (2008).
39. See Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 261, 284–87 (2005).
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megawatts (MW) of photovoltaic generation located in or around
each major metro area might have prevented the August 14, 2003
40
blackout of the East Coast. The United States could tap 900,000
MW of off-shore wind potential, much of it near urban areas along
the Eastern seaboard, according to a U.S. Department of Energy
41
report. The European Union forecasts that the Union will have at a
minimum 40,000 MW of off-shore wind energy in place in the
42
European Union by the year 2020.”
Although renewable resources are distributed across the United
States and the world, they are not distributed evenly. “Nine states
east of the Mississippi River do not have any sub-regions with high
wind resources . . . .
[S]ix states ranging from Virginia to
Massachusetts . . . do not have any sub-regions with at least 250,000
43
metric tons of currently available biomass [annually].”
The
northeastern region of the United States has relatively dense
populations and significant electricity demand. Although they have
access to renewable resources, those renewable resources are not as
concentrated as in other areas of the United States. Absent the
ability to generate energy on their own, urban areas are left with
energy efficiency as a substitute for additional generation capacity
44
that they require on a net basis.
III. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS TO FACILITATE RENEWABLE POWER
Where renewable energy resources do exist, their deployment
can be incentivized in a variety of ways. Primarily, aside from global
warming reduction requirements, these incentives include tax credits,

40. Steven Letendre & Richard Perez, Understanding the Benefits of Dispersed GridConnected Photovoltaics: From Avoiding the Next Major Outage to Taming Wholesale Power
Markets, ELECTRICITY J., July 2006, at 64, 68.
41. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, GENERAL ELECTRIC, AND MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY
COLLABORATIVE, A FRAMEWORK FOR OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (2005), available at http://www.masstech.org/offshore/final_09_20.pdf.
42. 40,000 MW by 2020: Building offshore wind in Europe, Renewableenergyworld.com,
Jan./Feb. 2008, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/ news/reworld/story?id=51595.
43. Marilyn A. Brown et al., Reduced Emissions and Lower Costs: Combining Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency into a Sustainable Energy Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J.,
May 2007, at 62, 64. These resources count agricultural residues, crops, animal manure, wood
residues, municipal discarded materials and methane from landfill, as well as dedicated crop
biomass. Id. at 64 n.9. With the exception of Florida, the eastern half of the United States is
2
devoid of sub-regions capable of producing 6.0 kWh/m /day with solar photovoltaic resources on
south-facing structures and surfaces. Id. at 64.
44. See generally MARILYN A. BROWN ET AL., TOWARDS A CLIMATE-FRIENDLY BUILT
ENVIRONMENT (2005).
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renewable trust funds, renewable portfolio standard requirements,
and promotional feed-in tariffs paid for the sale and delivery of
renewable energy.
A. Tax Credits
In the United States, the Production Tax Credit (PTC) set forth
in section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code remains the cornerstone
45
of federal policies supporting renewable energy.
The PTC was
originally enacted as part of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and has
been periodically extended, with each extension lasting only for a
46
limited period.
Qualified facilities (QFs) are wind, closed-loop
biomass, open-loop biomass, geothermal, small irrigation power,
47
municipal solid waste, and qualified hydropower facilities. In 2006,
the amount of the credit was $0.019 per kilowatt hour (kWh)
48
generated by wind, closed-loop biomass, geothermal and solar
energy facilities, and $0.01per kWh for open-loop biomass, small
irrigation power, landfill gas, trash combustion and qualified
49
hydropower facilities. The PTC applies for ten years for wind and
closed loop biomass and open-loop biomass built after August 8, 2005
and five years for other QFs following the date that the QF was
originally placed in service. Despite the importance of the PTC,
renewable power is additionally encouraged in certain states by other
50
significant tax incentives.

45. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
46. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 extended the PTC to qualified facilities
placed in service before January 1, 2009. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-432, § 201, 120 Stat. 2922, 2944.
47. The PTC also applies to refined coal. 26 U.S.C. §§ 45(c)(7), (d)(8), (e)(8) (2006).
48. Section 710 of The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 extended the PTC to open–
loop biomass, geothermal energy, solar energy, small irrigation power, and municipal solid
waste facilities. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 710, 181 Stat. 1418,
1552–57. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 extended the PTC to facilities placed in service before
January 1, 2008, but the in-service date for solar energy facilities was not extended, and remains
January 1, 2006. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1301, 119 Stat. 594, 986 (2005).
49. I.R.S. Notice 2006-51, 2006 IRB LEXIS 353, 2006-25 I.R.B. 1144, at *11–12 (June 19,
2006).
50. According to the Department of Energy Funded Database of State Incentives for
Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), twenty-six states offer some type of solar energy tax
incentive with over 51 different types of programs. Overall there are 228 different types of
rebates available in the states for renewable energy. See Rusty Haynes, N.C. Solar Center, N.C.
State University Solar America Cities Annual Meeting (April 15, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/library).
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Many European countries also use tax subsidies to promote
renewable power development. For example, in Sweden, the value of
51
financial subsidies to wind projects is approximately $0.025 per kWh.
B. System Benefits Charges/Renewable Trust Funds
A system benefits charge (SBC) is a tax on utility consumption,
or a surcharge mechanism, for collecting funds from electric
consumers, the proceeds of which then support a range of energy
activities. In order to support demand-side management programs,
or renewable resources, a system benefits charge is used to
inconspicuously collect funds, which then support a range of energy
52
activities, from electricity consumers so that those technologies can
53
compete in price with more conventional technologies.
Between 1998 and 2012, approximately $3.5 billion will be
collected by the original fourteen states with existing renewable
system benefit charges to endow energy trust funds. More than half
the amount collected—at least $135 million per year—comes from
54
California alone.
As of 2006, state’s energy trust funds had
committed almost $400 million to support 2249 MW of renewable
55
energy capacity. Most of these state programs only provide financial
assistance to new projects, to the exclusion of existing renewable
56
projects prior to program implementation. Approximately half of
this capacity had been constructed, while the other half was in the
57
development stage. “The funding levels [of these state charges on
electric distribution] range from $0.07 per MWh in Wisconsin up to

51. A. Kovski & J. Fordney, Specialist Detail Essentials For Renewables: Subsidies,
Mandates And More Transmission, PLATTS ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, Mar. 10, 2008 at 7, 8.
52. FERREY, supra note 17, § 10:95.
53. Id.
54. Steven Ferrey, Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State
Level, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2006, at 52, 53.
55. M. BOLINGER & R. WISER, THE IMPACT OF STATE CLEAN ENERGY FUND SUPPORT
FOR UTILITY-SCALE RENEWABLE PROJECT 2 (May 2006), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/
ea/EMS/cases/LBNL-56422.pdf.
56. Ferrey, supra note 54, at 53.
57. See BOLINGER & WISER, supra note 55, at 7.
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almost $0.6 per MWh in Massachusetts.”
59
about $0.01 per kWh of consumption.

58

137

The mean value is

The form of administration of renewable trust funds varies. Many
states administer them through a state agency, while others use a
quasi-public business development organization. Some funds are
managed by independent third-party organizations, some by
existing utilities, while two states allow large customers to selfdirect the funds. For distribution, some states utilize an investment
model, making loans and equity investments. Other states provide
financial incentives for production or grants to stimulate supplyside development.
Some other states use research and
development grants, technical assistance, education, and
60
demonstration projects.
As of 2001, the only state program to provide assistance to entities
outside of the state with its trust funds was Rhode Island, which
provided a grant to a wind project in Massachusetts that was in
danger of losing its construction permits. It is reported that
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have expressed a
willingness to fund out-of-state projects. In critiquing these
projects and the hesitancy of the majority of states to fund out-ofstate projects, two different federally funded national energy
research laboratories highlight this only as a practical concern. In
fact, there are significant legal issues raised by such taxation of
interstate electricity sales to fund exclusively in-state renewable
61
energy projects.

Table 1 provides an illustration of these state programs in the
Northeast.

58. Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning
the Energy Future through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
507, 524 (2004).
59. MARTIN KUSHLER, ET AL., FIVE YEARS IN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST HALFDECADE OF PUBLIC BENEFIT ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES 10, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN
ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. REP. NO. U041, April 2004.
60. Ferrey, supra note 58, at 524–25.
61. Id. at 640.
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Table 1: Seven Northeast State Public Benefits Funding Renewable Projects
State

Funding

Renewables Uses and Eligibility

Connecticut

0.5 mills/kWh in 200062

Solar, wind, ocean thermal, wave,

0.75 mills in 2002

tidal, landfill gas, low emission

1 mill in 2004 - $28 million/year

biomass, fuel cells. Economic

average through 2012

development and renewables for

Fund reduced by approx. 33% in FY04

customers.

and for next 7 years to pay back bonds

May invest in out-of-state renewable

Massachusetts

issued to cover state budget deficit.

projects.

Averages 0.95 mills/kWh first 5 years =

New solar, wind, ocean, advanced

$40 million per year. 0.25 mills

biomass, fuel cells, possibly DSM and

dedicated for MSW pollution controls

distribution generation.

or retirement.
0.5 mills thereafter (no MSW) ~$20$25 million/year.
New Jersey

1.8 mills/kWh for energy efficiency and

Class I renewables (wind, PV, solar

Class I renewables for first 4 years; 2.1

thermal, biomass, fuel cells, LFG,

mills/kWh next 4 years (min. of $107.5

wave/tidal, and geothermal.)

million/yr through 2008).

Allocation of renewable energy funds

75% of funds for efficiency $9~105

is 60% customer sites, 40% grid

million/yr avg)

supply in 2001, and split 50/50 each

25% of funds for Class I renewables

year thereafter.

(~$35 million/yr avg)
2001 BPU Order sets initial 3 year
(2001-2003) funding level at $358.5
million (75% for efficiency, 25% of
Class I renewables).
New York

0.6 – 1.0 mills/kWh per utility; avg. ~0.7

Wind, solar, biomass.

mills

Competitive bidding by technology.

~$78 million/yr for 3 years (1999-2001)

Funding programs include grants,

Efficiency = 67%; renewables/R&D =

loans, guarantees, investments, buy

18%; low-income = 14%

downs, and rebates.

$17 million over three years for
renewables (including $4 million from
Niagara Mohawk)
Fund extended at $150 million/yr for 5
years. $70 million over 5 years for
renewables, including $47.5 million for

62. A mill is one-tenth of one cent.
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Table 1: Seven Northeast State Public Benefits Funding Renewable Projects
State

Funding

Renewables Uses and Eligibility

wind power, and the rest for biomass
and solar.
Rhode Island

2.3 mills/kWh 1997-2012, (2.0

Wind, solar, sustainable, biomass,

mills/kWh for DSM programs and 0.3

existing hydro 100 MW or less.

mills/kWh for renewables)
~$17 million/yr, with 2.5 million/yr for
renewable

As Table 2 illustrates, the funding level is in the range of $175 to
$250 million annually for the cumulative impact of the fourteen state
63
renewable energy system benefit charge and trust fund programs.
“While many of these programs are set up to run indefinitely, others
have set life-spans. The level of per capita funding ranges from
$0.90–$4.40 annually for renewable energy. Expressed another way,
for each megawatt hour sold in the state, the level of subsidy ranges
64
from $0.07–$0.59.”
Table 2: Renewable System Benefit Funding Levels and Program Duration65
State

CA

CT

DE

IL

MA

MT

NJ

Approximate Annual

Per-Capita

Per-MWh

Funding ($million)

Annual Funding

Funding

$135

$4.0

$0.58

1998 - 2011

$15 - $30

$4.4

$0.50

2000 - indefinite

$1 (maximum)

$1.3

$0.09

10/1999 - indefinite

$5

$0.4

$0.04

1998-2007

$30 - $20

$4.7

$0.59

1998 - indefinite

$2

$2.2

$0.20

1999 - July 2003

$30

$3.6

$0.43

2001-2008

63. Id. at 525.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 526–27.

Funding Duration
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$4

$2.2

$0.22

2007 - indefinite

$6 - $14

$0.7

$0.11

7/1998 - 6/2006

$15 - $5 (portion of)

$1.3

$0.09

2001 - 2010

$8.6

$2.5

$0.17

10/2001 - 9/2010

$10.8 (portion of)

$0.9

$0.08

1999 - indefinite

$2

$1.9

$0.28

1997 - 2002

$1 - $4.8

$0.9

$0.07

4/1999 – indefinite

Vol. 20:125

C. PURPA Renewable Power Purchase Obligations
Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA) as part of a legislative initiative “designed to combat
66
the nationwide energy crisis.” Even though PURPA was somewhat
restricted by changes in federal law in 2005, its requirement that
regulated retail utilities purchase renewable power from QFs, was
67
and remains a primary incentive for renewable power development.
In an effort to reduce United States consumption of fossil fuels and
reliance on foreign energy supplies, Congress sought to promote the
development of alternative energy sources, including cogeneration
68
and small power production.
Prior to PURPA, an independent
cogenerator or small power producer seeking to interconnect with an
69
electric utility confronted at least three primary obstacles:
 Some utilities used their monopoly power to refuse to
purchase electric power generated by such sources, and
refused to interconnect with the facility, or offered the
70
QF inadequate prices for a purchase.

66. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745 (1982).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006).
68. See Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to Environmentally Sculpt the
Deregulated Electric Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 129–33 (2002).
69. See Steven Ferrey, Nothing But Net: Renewable Energy and the Environment,
MidAmerica Legal Fictions, and Supremacy Doctrine, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (2003).
70. Steven R. Miles, Full-Avoided Cost Pricing Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act: “Just and Reasonable” to Electric Consumers?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1984).
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Some utilities charged those entities that cogenerated
discriminatory rates for supplementary, back-up, and
71
maintenance service.
 Federal and state laws posed a problem for an
interconnected cogenerator or small power producer
[QF] in that it could subject itself to plenary public utility
regulation, under either the Federal Power Act and/or
72
the Public Utility Holding Company Act.
The purpose of Congress in enacting PURPA section 210 was to
73
eliminate these obstacles. Under PURPA, if a power generation
project satisfies specified legal requirements, it is characterized as a
74
QF and is entitled to regulatory benefits. A QF produces electric
energy solely by the use of biomass, waste, renewable resources,
geothermal resources or any combination thereof, and is not greater
in gross capacity than eighty megawatts unless it also cogenerates
75
power.
PURPA requires that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) establish regulations that obligate
public utilities to sell electric energy to and purchase power
from QFs [at nondiscriminatory prices]. PURPA also
specifies that the rates established by FERC for these
purchases may not exceed the “incremental cost” to the
utility of purchasing alternative electric energy.
This
“incremental cost” is defined as the cost to the electric utility
of the electric energy which, but for the purchase from such
[QF], such utility would generate or purchase from another
76
source.
77
Electric utilities must offer to sell necessary backup,
78
79
80
interruptible, maintenance, or supplemental power to QFs.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1268–69.
74. Ferrey, supra note 68, at 136–42.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 796 (2006).
76. Plymouth Rock Energy Assocs. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 648 N.E.2d 752, 754 (Mass.
1995) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d)) (citations omitted); see also Ferrey, supra note 68, at 138–
41.
77. Backup power is electric energy or capacity during an unscheduled outage to supply
power and is generally self-generated. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(9).
78. Interruptible power is power or capacity supplied by an electric utility to a QF subject
to interruption under specific conditions. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(10).
79. Maintenance power is power or capacity supplied by an electric utility to a QF during
periods of scheduled outages. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(11).
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PURPA requires that such power sales by an electric utility to a QF
be nondiscriminatory and “just and reasonable and in the public
81
interest.” Essentially, there must be a cost basis and fair justification
for any QF power sale activity that is inconsistent with economic
principles.
Commentators argue that QF buyback rates calculated under the
PURPA avoided-cost principal are not adequate since the wholesale
power buyback rates “capture only a fraction” of the environmental
82
and distributed benefits of deployment of the technology to society.
They argue that at a minimum, buy-back rates should be calculated
based on the full value to society, including energy, capacity value,
83
and distribution system value or “total facility avoided cost.”
84
The Energy Policy Act (EP Act) of 2005 added section 210(m)
to PURPA, which permits the termination of an electric utility’s
obligation to purchase energy from QFs if FERC finds that the QF
85
has nondiscriminatory access to wholesale electric markets.
If
FERC finds that the QF has non-discriminatory access, it would
eliminate “the QF purchase mandate for utilities operating in the
organized markets that have so-called ‘Day 2 markets’ —MISO, ISONew England, PJM, and NYISO—because they offer transparent
86
spot markets into which all generators can sell” power. FERC

80. Supplementary power is power or capacity supplied by an electric utility to a QF to
augment self-generated electricity. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(8).
81. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(a).
82. AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., SMALL IS PROFITABLE: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF MAKING
ELECTRICAL RESOURCES THE RIGHT SIZE 331–32 (2002).
83. See id.
84. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1253, 119 Stat. 594 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006)).
85. PURPA 210(m)(1) sets out the following criteria for non-discriminatory markets:
(A)(i) independently administered, auction-based day ahead and real time wholesale
markets for the sale of electric energy; and (ii) wholesale markets for long term sales of
capacity and electric energy; or
(B)(i) transmission and interconnection services that are provided by a Commissionapproved regional transmission entity and administered pursuant to an open access
transmission tariff that affords nondiscriminatory treatment to all customers; and (iii)
competitive wholesale markets that provide a meaningful opportunity to sell capacity,
including long-term and short-term and real-time sales to buyers other than the utility
to which the qualifying facility is interconnected. In determining whether a meaningful
opportunity to sell exists, the commission shall consider, among other factors, evidence
of transactions within the relevant market; or
(C) wholesale markets for the sale of capacity and electric energy that are, at a
minimum, of comparable competitive quality as markets described in subparagraphs
(A) and (B).
16 U.S.C. § 210(m)(1) (2006).
86. Andrea Robinson, Proposed Rule Would End PURPA “Put” in Some Power Markets,
Jan. 24 2006, http://www.energylegalblog.com/archives/2006/01/24/1602.
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regulations provide that in Day 2 markets there is a rebuttable
presumption that a QF with a capacity above 20 MW has nondiscriminatory access to a wholesale market as defined in PURPA
87
section 210(m)(1)(A). An electric utility member of a Day 2 market
must file an application with FERC for relief from the purchase
88
requirement.
On January 19, 2006, FERC issued a notice of proposed
89
rulemaking. On October 20, 2006, FERC issued Order No. 688 as a
90
Final Rule to implement PURPA section 210(m). This order found
that five Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) afforded nondiscriminatory market access to QFs and placed the burden on the
QFs in these five RTO areas to demonstrate that the market does not
afford them non-discriminatory access in order to maintain their
power purchase entitlements. In Order 688, FERC found that
Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator (Midwest
ISO), PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), ISO New England, Inc.
(ISO-NE), and New York Independent System Operator (NYISO)
qualify as markets [with non-discriminatory access] described in §
292.309(a)(1)(i) and (ii), and there is a rebuttable presumption that
qualifying facilities with a capacity greater than 20 megawatts have
nondiscriminatory access to those markets through Commissionapproved open access transmission tariffs and interconnection
rules, and that electric utilities that are members of such regional
transmission organizations or independent system operators
(RTO/ISOs) should be relieved of the obligation to purchase
91
electric energy from the qualifying facilities.

In May 2007, FERC ruled that QF obligations were no longer to
be imposed on utilities owned by Duke Energy in the Midwest under
92
the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

87. 18 U.S.C. § 292.310 (2006).
88. Id.
89. New PURPA 210(m) Regulations Applicable to Small Power Cogeneration Facilities,
71 Fed. Reg. 4532 (proposed Jan. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 292).
90. New PURPA 210(m) Regulations Applicable to Small Power Cogeneration Facilities,
71 Fed. Reg. 64,342 (final rule) (issued Oct. 20, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 292), aff’d
on appeal, Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 550 F.3d 1179 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
91. 18 C.F.R. § 292.309(e) (2009). FERC also found that the California Independent
System Operator and the Southwest Power Pool satisfy the criteria for transmission and
interconnection services provided by an approved RTO and administered pursuant to openaccess transmission tariff affording nondiscriminatory treatment. 18 C.F.R. § 292.309(g) (2009).
FERC also found that ERCOT is a market of comparable competitive quality to Midwest ISO,
PJM, ISO-NE and NYISO. 18 C.F.R. § 292.309(f) (2009).
92. In re Duke Energy Shared Servs. Inc., 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,146 (May 17, 2007).
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The burden will be on the utility to demonstrate that the small
93
By contrast,
QF has non-discriminatory access to the market.
PURPA section 210(m) and FERC Order No. 688 do not modify the
“rights or remedies of any party under any contract or obligation, in
effect or pending approval before the appropriate state regulatory
authority on non-regulated electric utility on or before August 8,
94
2005.” If FERC determines that in 2006 or later, QFs have nondiscriminatory market access, they are allowed to relieve utilities of
the QF power purchase obligation. Having open access to the spot
markets in RTOs does not necessarily mean that there is access to
long-term markets on a non-discriminatory basis.
IV. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AS THE STATE ELIXIR
A. RPS Design and Contours
An alternative to feed-in tariffs is state mandatory minimum
renewable energy supply requirements, which are usually imposed on
electric utilities or independent retail suppliers. These alternatives
typically are known as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs).
“A resource portfolio requirement requires certain electricity
sellers and/or buyers to maintain a predetermined percentage of
95
designated clean resources in their wholesale supply mix.” Contrary
to SBCs, RPS programs transfer the risks and benefits of achieving a
percentage of renewables to the private sector. “The key to making
the portfolio requirements work is to establish trading schemes for
96
‘portfolio obligations.’” “The standards become self-enforcing as a
97
condition of retail sale licensure.” “The advantage[ ] of a portfolio
standard is that it does not subsidize any particular technology or
98
locus of that technology.” “Resource portfolio requirements can be
applied under any wholesale or retail competition, without placing
99
any entities at a disadvantage.”
State RPS program designs vary as to
 Energy versus capacity obligations;
 Single-tier or multi-tier credit determinations;
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

18 C.F.R. § 292.309(d) (2009).
18 C.F.R. § 292.314 (2009).
Ferrey, supra note 58, at 529.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 531.
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Duration of purchase obligations;
Requirements for resource diversity;
Incentives for resource or technology diversity;
Participation requirements for default service providers;
Geographic eligibility for credits;
Differentiation by type of renewable resource;
Rules governing which generation units can earn credits;
Definitions of new or incremental generation, where
applicable;
 Categorization of multi-fuel facilities and off-grid
resources; and,
 Eligibility of customer-side distributed generation.
Half of the U.S. states have enacted RPS programs to promote
renewable energy power production. Half of that half employ
differentiated tiers of Renewable Energy Credits or Certificates
100
(RECs). Some states distinguish tiers of RECs by the year in which
101
the REC was created or the type of renewable resource used in
102
creation of the REC, so as to promote certain technologies. Some
103
Other
states create technology set-asides or bands of technology.
states have only a single type, or tier, of REC regardless of the
technology used to create the REC, with only newly constructed
104
renewable energy projects permitted to sell RECs.
Other states

100. RECs are a regulatorily-created embodiment of the renewable attribute of a unit of
electric power generation. Typically representing one megawatt-hour of power generation from
a renewable or alternative electric power generation source, as defined in state law, that
registers with a particular state to simultaneously create such RECs as an additional element of
its generation. These RECs, after creation, are sold to retail electricity sellers in the state, which
are required each year to have a designated percentage of their power to be generated by such
renewable or alternative technologies. As a condition on the supply of power at retail,
Renewable Portfolio Standards, that create RECs, impose requirements on retail suppliers of
power, as a mechanism to subsidize the construction of new renewable generating sources.
These subsidies do not have to be funded with tax monies, but instead become largely invisible
increases in the cost of electric power, which are passed on in higher rates to consumers of this
essential product or service.
101. Rhode Island and Delaware (partially) have such systems. Database of State
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Rules Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy,
http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
102. Such states include Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, Washington DC, and Texas
(partially). Id.
103. Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania and Washington DC are examples of this. Id.
104. Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana (for out-of-state projects) and the Minnesota program
covering XCEL are examples of this. Id.
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have a single tier that allows both new and existing projects to
105
qualify. This creates myriad variations on state RPS models.
B. RPS State Variations and Results
RPS programs exist in twenty-five states and the District of
106
Columbia; four more states have nonbinding RPS goals. “In 2007,
four states established new RPS policies, eleven states significantly
revised pre-existing RPS programs . . . and three states created non107
binding renewable energy goals.” These mandatory RPS programs
108
RPS
cover forty-six percent of nationwide retail electricity sales.
programs were initially created in states that had restructured and/or
deregulated their retail power markets; however, over time, half of
the RPS programs were being created in traditional monopolized
states. Representative northeast state RPS programs are illustrated
in Table 3.
The evolution of RPS programs occurred over the past fifteen
years. Iowa and Massachusetts established renewable portfolio
109
standards in 1991 and 1997, respectively. By the end of 2007, more
than twenty-five states and the District of Columbia had enacted RPS
policies requiring that over time, between two and forty percent of
110
electricity come from renewable energy sources. Among the most
populous states, California has a thirty-three percent RPS target by
111
2020 and New York has a twenty-four target by 2013.
The RPS programs in the states are very different in terms of
what qualifies as a renewable resource. Most states allow solar, wind,
biomass, and landfill gas resources to qualify in RPS programs;
however, states are less consistent regarding eligibility for biogas,
MSW, geothermal, all hydro resources, fuel cells and ocean tidal

105. California (partially), Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Montana (for in-state
projects), New Mexico, New York (partially), Nevada, Pennsylvania, Texas (partially), and
Wisconsin are examples of this. Id.
106. RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT WITH DATA THROUGH 2007, REPORT NO. LBNL 154E, at
1 (2008). In 2007, Illinois, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Oregon established new RPS
policies. Id. at 35 tbl.A-1.
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 4 fig.2.
110. K.S. CORY & B.G. SWEZEY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE STATES: BALANCING GOALS AND IMPLEMENTATION
STRATEGIES, REPORT NO. NREL/TP-670-41409, at 1 fig.1 (2007).
111. Id. at 1 fig.1, fig.22.
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112

renewable resources.
Some states count co-generation, while
Pennsylvania includes coal gasification and non-renewable distributed
113
generation.
“Resource eligibility in state RPS programs has
expanded beyond traditional renewables, with three states now
allowing demand-side energy efficiency to meet at least a portion of
114
their RPS requirement.”
Some states set standards based on a
percentage of installed capacity, while others set standards based on a
115
percentage of total electricity sales. Some states allow credits to be
116
traded, while other states do not.
In about half of the RPS programs, solar energy installations are
117
being encouraged in a variety of ways. Several states award rebates
118
to customers who install solar systems. Solar-specific RPS designs
in eleven states and Washington D.C. include solar or distributed
119
generation set-asides for a percentage of eligible projects.
These
set-aside policies have already supported 102 MW of solar
120
photovoltaics and 65 MW of solar-thermal electric capacity.
Roughly 6700 MW of solar capacity would be needed by 2025 to fully
121
meet existing set-aside requirements.
Eligible project technologies are set forth in Table 4.
TABLE 3: Portfolio Standards and Trust Funds in Early Adopter States122
State Name

Renewable Energy Trust Fund

Portfolio Standards

Arizona

X

X

California

X

Colorado

X

Connecticut

X

Delaware

X

X

112. Id. at 4 tbl.1.
113. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Big IS Beautiful: The Case for Federal
Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 48, 50.
114. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 11 & tbl.4.
115. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 113, at 50.
116. Id. at 2.
117. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 27 n.21.
118. Id. at 11–12, tbl.3.
119. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 1.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The number of types of RPS programs evolves constantly. For a current inventory of
the state of RPS programs, see Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency,
Summary Maps, http://www.dsireusa.org/summarymaps/index.cfm?ee=1&RE=1 (last visited
Dec. 28, 2009).
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Hawaii
Illinois

X
X

Iowa

X

Maine

X

Maryland

X

Massachusetts

X

X

Minnesota

X

X

Montana

X

Nevada
New Jersey

X
X

X

New Mexico

X

New York

X

Ohio

X

Oregon

X

Pennsylvania

X

Rhode Island

X

X

Texas

X

Vermont
Wisconsin

Vol. 20:125

X
X

X

Table 4: “Renewable” Resources as Defined in State Statutes123
State

Solar

Wind

Fuel Cell

Methane/Landfill

Arizona

X

X

California

X

X

Connecticut

X

X

X

Iowa

X

X

X

Illinois

X

X

Maine

X

X

X

Maryland

X

X

X

X

Massachusetts

X

X

X

X

Biomass

Trash-toEnergy

Minnesota

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

Nevada

X

X

X

New Jersey

X

X

X

X

X

X

New Mexico

X

X

X

X

X

X

New York

X

X

Oregon

X

X

X

Pennsylvania

X

X

X

123. Id.

X
X
X

X
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X

X

Texas

X

X

Wisconsin

X

X

X

X

149

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Table 4: “Renewable” Resources as Defined in State Statutes (continued)
State

Hydro

Arizona

Tidal

Geothermal

X

California

X

Connecticut

X

Photovoltaic

Dedicated Crops

X
X

X
X

Iowa

X

Illinois

X

Maine

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

New Jersey

X

X

X

X

New Mexico

X

X

X

X

New York

X

X

X

X

Oregon

X

X

X

X

X

Pennsylvania

X

X

X

X

Rhode Island

X

Texas

X

X

X

Wisconsin

X

X

X

Maryland
Massachusetts

X

X

X
X
X

X

Minnesota
Nevada

X
X
X

Note: Photovoltaic is included within solar in some states; methane or trash-to-energy may be
included within a broad definition of “biomass.”

124

RPS programs have had an impact on the move in the United
States to more deployment of renewable power projects. Over fifty
percent of the non-hydro renewable capacity additions in the U.S. for
the decade from 1998 through 2007 occurred in states with RPS
programs.
Ninety-three percent of these renewable electric
generation additions in all states came from wind power, four percent
from biomass, two percent from solar, and one percent from
125
geothermal resources.
In those states that have RPS programs,
more than ninety percent of renewable energy additions (and more
than eighty percent of average capacity supplied) is from wind power,
with biomass a distant second and limited geothermal resource
126
development. It is estimated that between sixty and ninety percent
124. Ferrey, supra note 54.
125. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 1.
126. Id.
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of RPS-driven renewable energy capacity additions going forward will
127
It has also been estimated that RPSs
be wind power projects.
motivated approximately forty-five percent of the 4300 MW of wind
power installed in the United States between 2001 and the end of
128
2004.
An additional fifteen percent of these installations were
129
motivated by state renewable energy trust funds and subsidies.
There are a variety of nuances and idiosyncrasies state-by-state.
RECs for RPS compliance have different longevities and shelf lives.
“The shelf life of a REC . . . can be as short as three months (in New
130
England) to as long as four years (in Nevada and Wisconsin).”
Massachusetts utilizes a confined period to transfer credits from
generators to retail suppliers but allows banking for two years of up
to thirty percent of the annual RPS requirement; Delaware, Maryland
along with the District of Columbia extend banking to a three-year
period, and California allows indefinite banking which perpetually
guarantees the longevity of credits once created as a function of
131
renewable power generation.
In some cases where RECs have
shorter life spans, they can be banked from one year to the next to
132
meet a certain percentage of the next year’s annual requirement.
States employing RPS programs treat customer-side generation
differently. While Massachusetts and Rhode Island only allow these
resources to earn RECs if they are located within the respective state,
Connecticut allows such facilities to earn credits when situated
133
elsewhere in the New England region.
There are several regional tracking systems in operation for
134
renewable energy attributes: the NEPOOL GIS, the PJM-EIS

127. Ryan Wiser and Mark Bolinger, Balancing Cost and Risk: The Treatment of Renewable
Energy in Western Utility Resource Plans, ELECTRICITY J., January 2006, at 48.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 5.
131. Id.
132. See ANDREW SCHWARTZ, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, RENEWABLE ENERGY
CERTIFICATES AND THE CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAM 28
(2006) (discussing banking in the California RPS).
133. Application of Pratt & Whitney for Connecticut Renewable Generator Qualification –
Cape Cod Community College Fuel Cell, Docket No. 04-05-13-RE01, 2005 WL 2293281 (Conn.
Dep’t of Pub. Utils. July 28, 2005) (reopening docket).
134. Renewable energy attributes include RECs, and can also include any regulatory credits
at the state or federal levels with regard to regulation of global warming gases and criteria
pollutant emissions. These are credits created by law to represent the nature or quality of the
environmental benefits associated with certain power generation technologies.
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135

GATS, the WREGIS, and the M-RET.
In addition to the
electronic REC tracking systems in place, Wisconsin also can
136
electronically track RPS within each state,
as well as in
137
Large
Texas/ERCOT and New Jersey (only for solar energy).
portions of the south, outside of Texas, do not have the ability to
138
track RECs.
“Because the definitions of . . . RECs created under
various state programs differ, there is significant geographic
139
limitation in cross-market REC trading and liquidity.”
140
Non-compliance penalties vary by state.
Average RPS
141
Alternative compliance
compliance in 2006 was ninety-four.
payments of more than $18 million were paid in 2006; financial
142
penalties have been applied in two states. The non-compliance or
alternative payment penalty ranges from around $0.05 per kWh in
California, Connecticut, Washington, Rhode Island, Maine and
Massachusetts, to lower amounts in other states (although New Jersey
and New Hampshire have equally high penalties for non-compliance
143
with Class I resources).
In 2005, sixty-two of the Massachusetts
RPS requirements were satisfied, while power sellers were required
to pay state penalties of $53.19 per MWh for the unsatisfied thirty144
eight percent.
The required percentage of energy delivered from renewables
ranges from 2% to 30% of annual retail sales in different state
programs, but these numbers can be deceiving, depending upon
whether electricity produced by preexisting renewable resources are
145
146
eligible to be counted. Maine is at the thirty percent level. A 2007
135. EDWARD A. HOLT & RYAN H. WISER, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., THE
TREATMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES, EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES, AND GREEN
POWER PROGRAMS IN STATE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS, REPORT NO. LBNL62574, at 7 (2007).
136. Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United
States, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 8, 12.
137. HOLT & WISER, supra note 135, at 7.
138. See id. at 7 fig. 3.
139. Steven Ferrey, When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal
“Additionality” Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 591, 626 (2009).
140. See CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 16 tbl.5.
141. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 1.
142. Id.
143. See CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 16 tbl.5.
144. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., ANNUAL RPS COMPLIANCE
REPORT FOR 2005, at 4 (2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/doer/rps/rps2005annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter MASS. 2005 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT].
145. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 626.
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amendment to the Maine RPS program now requires renewable
power to be percent of capacity by 2017, starting at one percent in
147
2008 and increasing by one percent annually.
The penalty for
noncompliance was set at $57.12 per MWh in 2007, which will rise
with inflation, and can be waived by the Public Utilities Commission
148
(PUC). Failure to comply can result in license revocation or other
149
financial penalties.
Rhode Island requires that 3% of the electricity portfolio be
150
renewable energy starting in 2007, rising to sixteen percent in 2020.
An alternative compliance payment of $50 per MWh in 2003 dollars
151
can be made in lieu of meeting the portfolio standard. Buyers also
152
can “bank” renewable certificates for up to two years for future use.
Connecticut will recognize RPS credits from other states in the
NEPOOL system until 2010, and thereafter will additionally
recognize credits from New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Maryland or Delaware if it is determined at that time that their RPS
153
program standards are similar to those of Connecticut. The details
of Northeast state’s RPS programs are illustrated in Table 5.
154
Fitch Ratings estimated in 2006 that the initial phase of U.S.
cap-and-trade CO2 emission reductions will cost electric utilities
155
Where it is directly sourcing
approximately $6.5 billion annually.
power, the Department of Defense must seek RECs for their military

146. Id. at 627 tbl.4.
147. Tom Tiernan, EEI Says some RPS targets ‘Unachievable’ as Industry deals with
Infrastructure Debate, PLATTS ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, May 5 2008, at 7.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES: STATUS,
PROSPECTS, AND IMPEDIMENTS 247 (2009), available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=12619&page=1.
151. Union of Concerned Scientists, Rhode Island Renewable Energy Standard Summary 6,
at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/rhode-island.pdf.
152. Id.
153. DPUC Review of RPS Standards and Trading Programs in New York, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, Maryland and Delaware, Docket No. 04-01-13, 2005 WL 3571725 (Conn. Dep’t of
Pub. Utils. Nov. 9, 2005).
154. The Fitch Group is a global rating agency that provides the world’s credit markets with
credit opinions. It is a majority-owned subsidiary of Fimalac, S.A., Paris, France. For additional
information, see www.fitchratings.com.
155. Fitch Puts Utilities' Initial CO2 Program Cost at $6.5 Bil; It Sees Cap-and-Trade
Imminent, PLATTS ELECTRIC. UTIL. WEEK, November 13, 2006, at 10. This was modeled on a
RGGI-capped model with carbon allowances trading at $10/allowance. It also concluded that
thousands of megawatts of electric generation capacity would have to be replaced with zeroemission energy sources.
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153

bases’ procurement of power in states where there are RPS
156
Analyses by the U.S. Energy Information
requirements.
157
158
Administration and the Union of Concerned Scientists forecast
that RPS systems can depress retail power prices by reducing the
demand for, and therefore the price of, fossil-fuel-fired generation
resources; reduce dependence on fossil fuels; promote renewable
energy development; and significantly reduce carbon dioxide
emissions.
Table 5: Seven Northeast State RPS Requirements159
State

Requirement

Technology Eligibility

Connecticut

Class I technologies:

Class I: solar, wind, landfill gas,

3 Classes

1% in 2004 +0.5%/yr;

new (post 7/1/03) run of river hydro

to 2% by 2006

(<= 5 MW), fuel cells, ocean

+1.5%/yr; to 5% by

thermal, wave or tidal, low-e RE

2008; +1%/yr to 7%

conversion tech., low NOx

in 2010 and thereafter

emitting, sustainable biomass

Class I or II

(Biomass facilities with quarterly

technologies: 3% in

avg. NOx emission rate <= 0.075

2004 and thereafter

lbs. per MMBTU. Existing (pre

REC

Trading

Prices

7/1/03) biomass facilities <= 500
kW are exempt from NOx emission
requirement.)
Class II: MSW, existing (prior to
7/1/03) run of river hydro (<= 5
MW), other biomass (facilities
must have quarterly avg. NOx
emission rate <= 0.2 lbs. per
MMBTU)

156. See
Bill
Opalka,
U.S.
Military
Leads
Green
Charge,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, July 29, 1009, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/
rea/news/article/2009/07/u-s-military-leads-green-charge.
157. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE NATIONAL ENERGY MODELING SYSTEM: AN
OVERVIEW,
REPORT
NO.
DOE/EIA-0581
(2009),
available
at
http://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/overview.
158. STEVEN L. CLEMMER, ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, A POWERFUL
OPPORTUNITY: MAKING RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY THE STANDARD (1999).
159. Adapted from Ferrey, supra note 139, at 627 tbl.4.
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30% of sales in 2000

Fuel cells, tidal power, solar, wind,

(start of competition)

geothermal, hydro, biomass, and

and thereafter as a

MSW (under 100 MW)

condition of licensing.

High efficiency cogen. systems of

Vol. 20:125

unlimited size.

Maryland

Tier 1 Renewables:

Tier l: solar, wind, biomass, landfill

1% in 2006,

gas, geothermal, ocean, fuel cells

increasing 1%

(renewable sources only), and

biannually to 7% in

small hydro (< 30 MW)

2018, increasing to

Tier 2: hydro, MSW, and

7.5% in 2019, and

incineration of poultry litter

thereafter
Tier 1 or 2
Renewables: 2.5%
2006-2018
1% of sales from new

Solar, wind, ocean thermal, wave,

>$50/mw

W/in ISO-

renewables by 2003

tidal, landfill gas, and low-emission

h

NE

+0.5%/yr. to 4% in

advanced biomass beginning

2009; +1 % per year

commercial operation or

thereafter until date

representing increase in capacity at

determined by

existing facility after 12/31/97.

Division of Energy

Hydro and MSW qualify as existing

Resources.

and are not eligible.

New Jersey

Class I or II

Class I: solar, wind, geothermal,

Class I

New

3 Classes

Technologies: 2.5%

wave, tidal energy, landfill gas, fuel

$750

Jersey

by 2004-2008.

cells, sustainable biomass

Class II

Maryland

Class I technologies:

Class II: MSW or hydro (<30 MW)

$350

0.74% in 2004;

that meets high environmental

Solar:

0.983% in 2005;

standards

$200

Massachusetts

2.037% in 2006;
2.924% in 2007; and
3.84% in 2008.
Solar Electric: 0.01%
in 2004; 0.017% in
2005; 0.0393% in
2006; 0.0817% in
2007; and 0.16% in
2008.
NJBPU sets
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requirements for 2009
and after, but must be
at or above 2008
levels (see comments
regarding proposed
RES requirements
through 2020.
New York

New renewable

Main Tier, wind, solar, ocean,

energy requirement:

biomass, biogas, fuel cells,

0.8% in 2006,

incremental hydro, and low-impact

increasing ~0.8%/yr

run-of-river hydro > 30 MW

to 6.56% in 2013.

Customer Tier: solar, wind

Customer-sited tier is

(<300kW), fuel cells, and methane

2% of total

digesters.

annual RES targets.
With existing baseline
renewable energy,
and generation
expected from state
purchase
requirement,
renewable energy
increases from
19.45% in 2003 to
24% in 2013 (an
additional 1% is
expected to come
from voluntary green
pricing programs).

Rhode Island

3% by 2007,

Solar, wind, ocean, geothermal,

increasing 0.5%/yr. to

biomass, co-firing, hydro (< 30

4.5% in 2010, then

MW), fuel cells using renewable

increasing by 1 %/yr.

resources

to 8.5% in 2014, then
increasing by
1.5%/yr. to 16% in
2019.
Requirement remains
at 16% in 2020 and
thereafter unless the

155
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PUC determines it is
no longer necessary.

C. The Value of Renewable Energy Credits and Offsets
The prices of traded RECs have been relatively high in three
states: Massachusetts, Connecticut (for Class I RECs), and Rhode
160
Island.
REC trading prices in other states have been significantly
161
lower; led by New Jersey Class I RECs. In most other states, supply
exceeds the demand for RECs, and the prices have trended at about
162
ten percent of those in the three highest states.
The price impact of RPS-mandated renewable energy projects
has been estimated to range between a 0.1% increase in retail rates
(in Maine, Maryland, New Jersey and New York) and a 1.1%
163
increase in Massachusetts.
In 2005, Massachusetts collected $19.6
million in alternative compliance payments under its RPS system, and
164
In a 2007 Massachusetts auction,
nearly $17.8 million in 2006.
RECs sold above the $0.055 per kWh alternative compliance payment
(ACP) that units must pay if they are deficient in RECs: 396 RECs
from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy were sold for a price of
$0.0571 per kWh during the first quarter of 2007, by Evolutions
165
Markets, well above the ACP. A utility RPS charge of only $0.001
per kWh would raise almost $4 billion annually if imposed across all
166
retailed power in the United States.
[There is] significant regulatory uncertainty around RPS programs.
Either a regulatory change in eligible projects, or court
interpretation of these programs, can cause great volatility in RECs

160. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 27 fig.15.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 28.
163. Wiser et al., supra note 136, at 16 & fig.4 (forecasting that the cost of this
implementation would be no more than one percent).
164. MASS. 2005 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 144, at 4; COMMONWEALTH OF
MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., ANNUAL RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT FOR 2006, at 4 (2008),
available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/doer/rps/rps-2006annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter
MASS. 2006 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT].
165. Press Release, Evolution Markets, Evolutions Markets to Host Renewable Energy
Certificates Auction for the Massachusetts Maritime Academy (Apr. 17, 2008),
http://new.evomarkets.com/pdf_documents/Evolution%20Hosts%20REC%20Auction%20for
%20Maritime%20Academy.pdf.
166. See
Energy
Info.
Admin.,
Electricity
Explained,
www.eia.doe.gov/basics/quickelectric.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2009). US retail electricity sales
equaled 3923814000 MWh in 2007. Id.
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pricing. For example, Connecticut Class I resources were originally
defined to include wind, landfill methane, fuel cell, and solar voltaic
resources, and REC prices ranged from $35 to $50 per REC with
this definition. However, in June 2003, the [l]egislature amended
the definitions to add certain biomass generation plants located in
New England as Class I resources if they reduced NOx emissions.
The Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control made an
advisory ruling that an existing biomass plant located in Maine
“retooled” to meet a lower NOx emission standard would qualify
for Class I Connecticut RECs. The market for Class I RECs came
crashing down, dropping the forward price for 2006 RECs by
approximately 90%, from near $35 per [MWh] to near $2.50 per
167
[MWh]. Prices later jumped back to near $30 to $50 per REC.

Massachusetts, in contrast, tightened the eligibility requirements
for biomass facilities. The Massachusetts Department of Energy
Resources replaced guidelines that allowed retrofitted biomass
facilities to qualify under the RPS with a policy statement that
168
specifically excluded such facilities from eligibility. The new policy
statement ultimately protected the Massachusetts REC price, which
169
hovered at the level of the ACP.
One-third of sales of “green” electricity are actually the purchase
of RECs, rather than the purchase by a consumer of generated
170
renewable energy.
In other words, rather than actually purchase
the energy output of a renewable generator through a bilateral
contract, buyers purchase just the state-created REC, rather than the
energy itself. This purchases the virtual representation of the
renewable energy, if not the energy itself. Seventy-seven percent of
171
In
the green power sales were sold to non-residential customers.
other words, businesses, rather than individual households, have
purchased the great majority of renewable attributes of power
generation. This evidences that commercial and institutional entities,
167. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 631–32.
168. MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., GUIDELINE ON THE MA RPS ELIGIBILITY OF
GENERATION UNITS THAT RE-TOOL WITH LOW EMISSION, ADVANCED BIOMASS
TECHNOLOGIES (2004), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/doer/rps/g-lebio.pdf;
MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., POLICY STATEMENT OF RPS ELIGIBILITY OF RETOOLED
BIOMASS PLANTS (2005), available at http://mass.gov/doer/rps/rps-pol-stat-elig-biomass.pdf;
MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., NOTICE OF INQUIRY REGARDING SOME PROPOSED REVISIONS
OF THE REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE DEFINITION OF "LOW-EMISSION, ADVANCED
BIOMASS POWER CONVERSION TECHNOLOGIES" (2005), available at http://mass.gov/
doer/rps/rps_notice_of_inquiry.pdf [hereinafter NOTICE OF INQUIRY].
169. NOTICE OF INQUIRY, supra note 168.
170. LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., GREEN POWER MARKETING IN
THE UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT 4 (2008).
171. Id.
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rather than ordinary residential consumers, are the mainstay of green
electricity purchasers.
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF STATE RPS PROGRAMS
A. Location of Renewable Resources: A Constitutional Issue
States regard the geographic location where RECs are created
differently:
 At least three states expressly require that the RECs be
created by in-state power generation, and two additional
states require that RECs be created either in-state or in
the service territory of a state utility—this raises some
172
dormant commerce clause issues.
 Some states require an in-state transmission
173
interconnection to count an out-of-state REC.
 Several states require that a REC actually be associated
with energy that is, or could be, by virtue of contracted
174
transmission capability, delivered in-state.
 Some states allow a wider trading area within an
Independent System Operator (ISO) or similar electric
175
transmission system region.
 Some states encourage, but do not require, RECs to be
traded in-state by attaching a multiplier value to in-state
176
RECs.
 Distributed generation typically must be located in-state
177
to qualify to create RECs.
Such state RPS eligibility rules regarding RECs may limit eligible
projects geographically. Some states attempt to limit projects to those
constructed within the state or require direct interconnection to the
state or state-connected regional grid, essentially to allow the moving
172. Iowa, the XCEL requirement in Minnesota, and Hawaii are examples of this. CORY &
SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 8.
173. Arizona and Texas are examples of this. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 8 tbl.2.
174. Arizona, California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, New Mexico, and New York are examples
of this. Delivery can be required on a real-time, a monthly, or a yearly basis. Id.
175. California, the New England states, Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are
examples of this, as are multi-jurisdictional utilities. In this case, unbundled RECs can trade
apart from the actual energy trade. Id.
176. Colorado, Delaware, and Arizona have attached in-state multipliers to RECs created in
the state. Id. at 12 tbl.3.
177. Requirements to create RECs in a state raise dormant commerce clause issues and
multipliers can raise similar concerns. Id. at 9.
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conductor electrons initiated outside the state to travel into the state.
Colorado, Illinois, and North Carolina give preference to in-state
178
projects. Hawaii and Iowa require RPS generation to be in-state or
179
California’s
from the service territory of an in-state utility.
amendments to its RPS law in 2006 for the first time in a decade
allowed new out-of-state generation to be counted toward RPS
requirements of load-serving entities in the state, removing
180
constitutional issues. Eight states require that the power eligible for
181
RPS RECs must be delivered to in-state load-serving entities.
Geographic program restrictions raise commerce clause concerns
182
under the Constitution.
A number of states prohibit REC credits
183
for out-of-state or out-of-region generation facilities. For example,
New England requires that a REC producer make arrangements on
an hourly basis to actually deliver the power to the New England
184
185
region.
New York has a similar system.
Rhode Island has
186
approved RPS credits for a project located in New York State, as
have other states.
The NEPOOL GIS tracking system will only track those
resources for RPS credit where out-of-region projects have obtained
“firm transmission” into the region of power equal to or exceeding
187
the generation from an eligible RPS renewable facility.
The
188
NEPOOL system is dispatched on an hourly-forward basis.
This
does not mean that the exact electrons moved by renewable energy
must enter the NEPOOL system. However, enough transmission
capacity must be under contract to carry the output of those
renewable resources into the NEPOOL region in order to create
189
credits in a New England state with an RPS program.
178. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 10.
179. Id.
180. See S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess, (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
portfolio/documents/sb_107_bill_20060926_chaptered.pdf.
181. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 10.
182. FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS (4th ed. 2007).
183. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 9 tbl.2.
184. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 8.
185. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 10 tbl.3.
186. STATE OF R.I. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, RHODE ISLAND RENEWABLE ENERGY
RESOURCES ELIGIBILITY APPLICATIONS (2008), http://www.ripuc.org/utilityinfo/RESApplications-Status(6-21-08).pdf.
187. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 8.
188. Id.
189. Re Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard – Delivery Requirements for Imports, 250
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 80 (N.Y. Pub. Servs. Comm’n June 28, 2006).
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Other systems, such as the PJM GATS system, provide a more
flexible REC accounting scheme. For the PJM region, this system
only requires monthly matching of power from eligible renewable
sources out of state to transmission capacity into the region in order
190
to qualify for a REC. This longer averaging period is much more
accommodating than an hourly matching period of out-of-state RECs
in the PJM region, which may or may not be physically moved into
the state (but for accounting purposes can show that it could have
been moved into the state) over committed transmission capacity.
The PJM interconnect now controls thirteen Mid-Atlantic states
191
and the District of Columbia’s transmission decisions. One can only
trade RPS credits inside the PJM member states if one is physically
located within the PJM geographic boundary. Certain member
states—such as Delaware, Maryland and the District of Columbia—
propose additional requirements of actual transmission into the
192
system for eligibility. Generators in the New York ISO can trade
RECs into Massachusetts, but generators in the PJM control area
193
cannot trade credits into New York.
Yet power does move across state borders, and as only “paper”
creations, RECs move to be registered in the state where they can be
traded for the highest value for the generator/trader. Certain highvalue REC states have experienced a proliferation of participating
RECs-creating facilities registering and trading RECs from outside
the state. Massachusetts has traded its general RECs at the highest
value. A 2008 report by the Massachusetts Department of Energy
Resources calculated that the number of plants providing RECs to
Massachusetts in 2004 was only nineteen; by 2007 this number had
194
risen to fifty-three plants.
The largest supply of Massachusetts
RECs, about thirty-nine percent, came from predominantly biomass
facilities in Maine, with other New England states providing
190. Re Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard: Order Authorizing Additional Main Tier
Solicitations and Directing Program Modifications, Case No. 0e-E-0188, 2006 WL 191959 (N.Y.
Pub. Servs. Comm’n Jan. 26, 2006).
191. See PJM Interconnection, PJM Territory Served, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/howwe-operate/territory-served.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2009); see also PJM Interconnection,
Re:new: PJM 2008 Annual Report 31 (2008), available at http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/whowe-are/~/media/about-pjm/newsroom/2008-annual-report.ashx.
192. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 113, at 51.
193. Id. at 52; see also Christopher B. Berendt, A State-Based Approach to Building a Liquid
National Market for Renewable Energy Certificates: The REC-EX Model, ELECTRICITY J., June
2006, at 54.
194. Lisa Wood, Massachusetts' REC Supply Now Equals Demand, A Sharp Reversal from
Recent Years, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Feb. 25, 2008, at 10.
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seventeen percent of RECs and New York and Quebec accounting
for twenty percent. This left only about one-quarter of Massachusetts
195
RECs originating in Massachusetts.
In 2007, the Massachusetts penalty rate for not having sufficient
196
RECs was $57.12 per REC.
Massachusetts had a seventy percent
RPS compliance rate in 2006, sixty-two percent in 2005, and fifty-nine
197
percent in 2004. In 2006, retailers paid $17.8 million in compliance
198
penalties to the state because they did not have sufficient RECs.
B. Legal Ownership of Traditional RECs
The FERC rule on ownership of RECs has sown much
confusion. Essentially, it leaves to states the determination of who
owns newly created, and in some cases previous QF-vintage, RECs.
Where ownership of RECs is allocated by contract, the contract
controls. However, most older QF power sale contracts were silent
199
on this issue.
FERC held that “contracts for the sale of QF capacity and
energy entered into pursuant to PURPA do not convey RECs to the
purchasing utility (absent express provision in a contract to the
contrary) . . . . [A] state may decide that a sale of power at wholesale
200
automatically transfers ownership of the state-created RECs.” An
April 2004 order denying rehearing restated the position taken in the
201
original order.

195. Id.
196. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., ANNUAL RPS COMPLIANCE
REPORT FOR 2007, at 6 (2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/doer/rps/rps2007annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter MASS. 2007 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT].
197. MASS. 2006 RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 164, at 14.
198. Id. at 4.
199. An exception was early contracts negotiated for QF power purchase by certain of the
New England utilities, which assigned all future credits related to air emissions to the utility
purchase. At the time, no such credits may have existed. See, e.g., Qualifying Facility contracts
executed by subsidiaries of the New England Electric System and its operating subsidiaries.
These contracts were assigned to the buyers of the generation assets of this electric system.
200. Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d 183 (2nd Cir.
2008) (quoting Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,004 (2003)).
201. Am. Ref-Fuel Co.,107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,016 (2004) (Thirteen other QFs, industry
associations, municipalities and others intervened in support of the petition. The Maine PUC,
and a group of eighteen other state utility commissions and utility purchasers of renewable QF
energy under PURPA contracts, intervened in opposition to the QFs’ petition. Another sixteen
parties intervened either with no position or in an untimely manner. While distribution utilities
that purchased QF power later claimed that they also implicitly owned future-created RECs,
they are arguing that impliedly they bought all later-created and non-negotiated attributes of
power generation. However, utilities have not claimed any ownership or responsibility for other
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FERC has delegated authority to states to determine ownership
of traditional RECs. The state rulings are split. Some states have
granted the RECs to utilities in transactions that do not specifically
address ownership of the RECs.
Sixteen states have adopted some legal position, the majority of
which have assigned vintage RECs under silent QF contracts to utility
202
purchasers of power. Two of the states have determined that QFs
must be compensated financially for relinquishing title to these
203
vintage RECs. Almost half of the states with new contracts have
allowed RECs to be retained by the QF where the contract is silent.
As a generalization, vintage QF RECs, where the contract is silent,
are vested with the utility purchaser of power, while new contracts,
204
where silent, retain the RECs with the power generator and seller.
In the great majority of states that require utilities to net meter power
to on-site generators, where REC ownership is not explicitly
addressed, RECs are allowed to be retained by the net-meter
205
generator.
Most states that provide additional cash or other subsidies to
renewable generators typically do not address whether any transfer of
206
RECs occurs in return for the funding. However, two states require
that, in return for funding, any RECs created are conveyed to the
207
entity supplying the funding.
There does not appear to be a
convincing legal rationale as to why exported net metered power
generation is treated in one manner regarding RECs and stand-alone
QF or otherwise eligible power generation is treated differently.

attributes of power generation such as emission of criteria or toxic pollutants from non-utility
generators with whom they contract for power. They have not claimed any responsibility for
purchasing offsets for NOx or SO2, not have they claimed ownership of environmental residues
such as bottom ash, fly ash, or other chemicals that are attributes of the generation of
electricity.).
202. ED HOLT ET AL., WHO OWNS RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES?
AN
EXPLORATION OF POLICY OPTIONS AND PRACTICE, REPORT NO. LBNL-59965, at xiv tbl.ES-2
(2006), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/59965.pdf.
203. Id. at 43.
204. See id. at xiii.
205. Id. at xiv. Of the first 12 states to address the issue in the context of net metering, six
states allowed the generator to retain all RECs, three states allowed the RECS from on-site use
of power to be retained by the generator and the RECs associated with exported excess net
power to be vested with the utility (although two of these three required compensation to the
customer for that title transfer), while one state divided the RECs between the two parties. Id.
at xv tbl.ES-3.
206. Id. at xv.
207. Id. at xvi tbl.ES-4.
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The Maine PUC concluded that RECs were “a fundamental
part” of legacy PURPA contracts and that the transactions
thereunder “were, in effect, a bundled sale of energy and attributes
208
that at the time represented a single product.”
On February 14,
2003, the Maine PUC created an explicit exception that “allow[s]
purchasers of the QF entitlements, who do not receive associated GIS
209
certificates, to use the entitlements.”
This decision created the
possibility of double counting, which the Maine PUC
210
acknowledged.
Pennsylvania’s Board of Public Utilities determined that the
211
ownership of RECs belongs to the purchaser.
In two separate
rulings, Minnesota Methane (involving landfill gas (LFG) produced at
212
the Harford Landfill), and Wheelabrator (regarding a resource
213
recovery project), , the Connecticut Department of Public Utility
Control (DPUC) vested ownership of RECs in the utility, citing the
214
FERC American Ref-Fuel decision.
The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the
Connecticut DPUC regarding ownership of RECs associated with
215
pre-existing QFs entitled to sell power to utilities under PURPA.
In two cases decided on the same day, the Court held that long-term
QF PURPA power sale contracts, executed prior to the existence of
the Connecticut REC program, did not entitle the QF to retain the
216
RECs.
Since, had the QFs not utilized renewable resources, the

208. Investigation of GIS Certificates Associated with Qualifying Facility Agreements,
Docket No. 2002-506, 2002 Me. PUC LEXIS 331 at *8 (Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 6, 2002).
209. Amendments to Information Disclosure Rule, Docket No. 2002-580, 2003 Me. PUC
LEXIS 75 at *9 (Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 14, 2003).
210. Id. at *32.
211. Petition for a Declaratory Order Regarding the Ownership of Alternative Energy
Credits and any Environmental Attributes Associated with Non-Utility Generation Facilities
under Contract to Pennsylvania Electric Company and Metropolitan Edison Company, Docket
No. P-00052149, 35 Pa. Bull. 2041, 2044–45 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n Apr. 2, 2005).
212. Application of Minnesota Methane, LLC Regarding the Sale of Electricity Generated
at the Hartford Landfill to the Connecticut Light and Power Company, Docket No. 96-0721RE01, 2004 Conn. PUC LEXIS 39 (Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control Mar. 19, 2004).
213. Petition of the Riley Energy Corporation for Contract Approval and Declaratory
Rulings Regarding the Lisbon Resources Recovery Project – Generation Information System
Certificates, Docket No. 91-01-12RE01, 2004 Conn. PUC LEXIS 148 (Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util.
Control Dec. 6, 2004).
214. Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d 183, 184 (2nd
Cir. 2008).
215. Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 931 A.2d 159 (Conn. 2007);
Minnesota Methane, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 931 A.2d 177 (Conn. 2007).
216. Wheelabrator Lisbon, 531 F.3d at 184.
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utility would have sidestepped paying the full avoided power
purchase price, the utility was entitled to the RECs, because to do
otherwise, the Court reasoned, would provide a windfall to the power
217
generators at the expense of utility ratepayers.
Other states have taken a pro-generator position. California
acted by legislation. In 2006, California Senate Bill 107 provided that
any sale of renewable power prior to 2005 included no RECs unless
218
the buyer of power explicitly purchased those RECs by contract.
Therefore, the legislature deemed that parties purchasing most
vintage renewable power sale and QF contracts in California would
not benefit from future state-created RECs, even though the
contracting parties would have entered the contract on similar terms
notwithstanding this fact.
Indeed, under PURPA, the utility
purchaser of power would have been required to enter this contract
219
on these terms.
In an unusual path to a decision, the Idaho PUC declined to rule
220
in two matters,
thereby avoiding leaving RECs with the project
owners, concluding that Idaho had no “state-created RECs” as
221
described in FERC’s American-Ref decision. The staff of the Idaho
PUC stated that if it did have the authority to rule, it would leave
222
ownership of the RECs with QF power generators.
C. Forecast of RPS Capabilities
As noted earlier, it is estimated that forty-five percent of the
4300 MW of wind power installed in the United States between 2001
and 2004 was motivated by state renewable portfolio standards, while
an additional fifteen percent of these installations were motivated by
223
Some analysts
state renewable energy trust funds and subsidies.
have concluded that the portfolio standard will be more influential in
217. Id. at 185.
218. S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess, (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
portfolio/documents/sb_107_bill_20060926_chaptered.pdf.
219. 16 U.S.C. § 824a (2006).
220. In the Matter of the Application of Idaho Power Company for Approval of an
Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Electric Energy Between Idaho Power Company and the
J.R. Simplot Company, Case No. IPC-E-04-16, Order No. 29577, 2004 Ida. PUC LEXIS 167
(Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 3, 2004); In the Matter of a Petition Filed by Idaho Power
Company for an Order Determining Ownership of the Environmental Attributes Associated
with a Qualifying Facility Upon Purchase by a Utility of the Energy Produced by a Qualifying
Facility, Case No. IPC-E-04-2, Order No. 29480, 2004 Ida. PUC LEXIS 76 (Idaho Pub. Utils.
Comm’n Apr. 27, 2004).
221. Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,016 (2003).
222. Id.
223. Wiser & Bolinger, supra note 127, at 48.
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promoting renewable
power development than the system benefit
224
charge or trust fund.
It is estimated that roughly half of new renewable energy power
capacity in the United States over the last decade has [occurred] in
states with RPS programs in place [ which constitute about 40% of
the states]. Over 90% of these capacity additions have come from
wind power, with biomass and geothermal resources in second and
third position . . . . The National Renewable Energy Laboratory
has estimated that RPS programs may result in only 8 to 12 GW of
new wind capacity (about 1% of U.S. installed total capacity)
relative to a base case where no RPS programs existed. Therefore,
the total contribution of RPS programs appears modest in terms of
225
total U.S. power resources.

This may be because portfolio standards allow market forces to
work; developers will develop the most cost-effective and reliable
renewable technologies eligible under a state program. SBCs, on the
other hand, may be directed at experimental, politically favored or
less cost-effective projects. The total expected renewable capacity
added by RPSs and SBCs in those states that have adopted them will
be dwarfed, making up less than ten percent of the total expected
increases in U.S. electric system non-renewable capacity during the
first decade of the new century, and will be less than 1% of total
226
United States electric capacity.
Nonetheless, in a number of states, including Massachusetts,
Nevada, Arizona, New York and California, new renewable energy
project developments are not currently on track to meet mandatory
RPS targets for renewable generation as a percentage of total retail
227
load. In some states, there are extensive exemptions from the RPS
purchase mandate or excuses for retailers not to obtain otherwise
required RECs along the lines of force majeure have been developed.
228
In several states regulatory commissions retain broad discretion to

224. Ryan Wiser et al., Emerging Markets for Renewable Energy: The Role of State Policies
During Restructuring, ELECTRICITY J., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 13, 19 (concluding that renewable
portfolio standards in eight states will be more influential than system benefit charges/trust
funds in 12 states in driving the overall renewable energy market between 2000 and 2010).
Texas is predicted to provide the most substantial domestic market for new renewable
generation, at 2,000 MW. California, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey are projected
to add 400 to 600 MW each, while the remaining states are expected to add less. These authors
expect the total from renewable portfolio standards and system benefit charges/trust funds to
exceed that driven by green power marketing efforts, alone. Id. at 20.
225. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 623.
226. Id. at 20.
227. Ryan Wiser et al., supra note 136, at 13.
228. Id. at 12.
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grant waivers to regulated entities that do not comply with state RPS
229
Very open-ended waiver or excuse provisions exist
requirements.
230
231
232
in the RPS programs in Arizona, Hawaii, Minnesota, and
233
Pennsylvania.
In some states, such as Massachusetts, where RECs have traded
in excess of $50 per MWh, RECs have been sold for as much as the
234
In such situations, the forwardvalue of the power generated.
monetized value of RECs is a critical component of renewable energy
235
financing.
However, unless there is the ability to monetize these
credits through long-term contracts or some variety of credit support
mechanisms, the forward value of this revenue stream may not be
translatable into project financing. REC prices under long-term
contracts are significantly lower (closer to the $25 range) than the
236
short-term spot market prices, which hover around the ACP rate.
Ambiguity in definitions allowed the Connecticut DPUC to
237
exempt two of the state’s largest utilities from state RPS obligations.
Other states, such as Massachusetts, require regulated utilities to sign
long-term power purchase contracts with renewable energy projects
238
that qualify to produce RECs.
Nevada has established a fund to
guarantee utility power purchase contracts that would cover RECs

229. Id.
230. In the Matter of the Proposed Rulemaking for the Renewable Energy Standard and
Tariff Rules, Docket No. RE-00C-05-0030, Decision No. 68566 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n March 14,
2006), available at http://www.cc.state.az.us/divisions/utilities/electric/RES-03-14-06.pdf.
231. H.B. 173 CD1, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2001).
232. S.F. 0004, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007).
233. S.B. 1030, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004).
234. Some RECs in Massachusetts have sold for above $50/Mwh, which is close to the ACP
which has increased with cost of living from $50/Mwh. See MASS. 2007 RPS COMPLIANCE
REPORT, supra note 196. In 2007, RECs in Massachusetts sold for approximately $50/Mwh.
See Housley Carr, Florida PSC to Weigh Delaying Rate Cases Until New Members are Seated,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Oct. 26, 2009, at 32. The wholesale trading price of power in the
ISO-NE market during 2009 has been approximately $40/Mwh.
See ISO New England,
www.ISO-NE.com (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
235. Where the value of the REC is approximately equal to the value of power sold, this
doubles the revenue stream earned by the generator of this power. This is significant in project
development. LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., GREEN POWER
MARKETING IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT (2009).
236. The recently offered NSTAR (NSTAR is the Investor Owned Utility which serves the
greater Boston area) Green REC program resells RECs from the Maple Ridge Wind Farm in
Upstate New York for ~1.4 cents per kWh. See NSTAR.com, NSTAR Green Customer
Information, http://www.nstar.com/residential/customer_information/nstar_green/nstar_green
.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
237. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 113, at 51.
238. 220 Mass. Code Regs. 17.00 (2009).
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239

purchases. Massachusetts utilizes its renewable trust fund to offer
various types of credit support for future RECs of eligible projects at
240
the development stage.
All of these incentives, particularly [s]tate RPS standards have
failed to substantially increase the deployment of renewable energy
technologies on a national scale. Non-hydroelectric renewable
energy resources continue to hover around 2% of the U.S.
electricity supply. Therefore, while various renewable technologies
are projected to double or triple their gross amount of power
contribution, this is not projected to have a significant impact for
two reasons. First, these renewable technologies are starting from a
very small base, so that even a large percentage increase translates
to a relatively small absolute increase. Second, electricity demand
in the United States is increasing, so the contribution of any given
project is a progressively smaller percentage of the increasing
241
generation base.

Even if states effectively implemented all of their existing RPS
mandates, emissions would be reduced by between 1% and 1.5%
242
from business-as-usual scenarios by 2015 to 2020.
Non-hydroelectric renewable energy deployment is expected to rise
from about 2% to [only 3% by 2015 and] 4% by 2030. Fossil-fired
energy resources are projected to maintain a roughly 70% share of
total electric generation in the United States and an 86% share of
total U.S. primary energy supply (including the transportation
sector) in 2030. Therefore, a radical departure is not projected by
243
the U.S. government between [2005] and 2030 in fossil fuel use.

Many of the REC obligations are short-term, and therefore are
not supporting long-term financing of eligible renewable resources
that would satisfy the RECs mandate. So, the forecast is that the RPS
239. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 21.
240. The Massachusetts Technology Collaborative (MTC) initiated two rounds of financing
called the Green Power Partnership (MGPP). The program is currently closed. The MGPP
aimed to address the lack of REC cash-flow certainty by providing long term REC contracts to
developers. Under the program MTC would assume some of the risk associated with
government mandated demand and the volatility of voluntary markets for RECs by signing
REC purchase agreement contracts with developers. MTC then sells the RECs on the open
market. The MTC places funds from REC sales into an escrow account providing to the
developer the creditworthiness required by equity and debt investors. Three types of REC
contracts were offered: Purchase Agreements, Put-Options, and Price-Collars. Funded projects
included wind, hydro, landfill gas, solar pv, and biomass. Mass. Tech. Collaborative Renewable
Energy Trust, Massachusetts Green Power Partnership, http://www.masstech.org/
renewableenergy/mgpp.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
241. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 632–33.
242. Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and
Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does this Say About Federalism and
Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1026 (2006).
243. Ferrey, supra note 139, at 633.
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system is not meeting its targets in several states, and is not expected,
alone, to meet the renewable power goals that it embodies.
There is an obvious connection between RPS renewable power
programs and goals for carbon reduction strategies. “That RPS
mandates are primarily carbon reduction mandates seems relatively
244
clear . . . . [T]his seems to be their primary perceived benefit.”
However, a criticism of an RPS system is that much more costeffective carbon reductions would be achieved by a carbon cap-andtrade system, resulting in greater reductions at one-third the cost per
245
In other words, renewable power generation
ton of carbon saved.
may not be the low-hanging fruit, as is energy conservation, for the
246
least expensive carbon reduction.
RPS renewable power requirements also are not necessarily seen
as additional carbon reductions, as they are assumed to become a
247
component of the overall carbon cap achievement. A cap-and-trade
carbon reduction program does not guarantee that any renewables
will be constructed. However, long-term, electric power is the
essential sector for carbon reduction and investments in power
248
generation are long-term infrastructure realities. As opposed to an
RPS system, some countries in Europe and elsewhere instead
promote renewable generation with feed-in tariffs outside of the
carbon reduction or cap programs.
Assuming that full compliance is achieved, current mandatory
state RPS policies, in just those states that have them, will require the
addition of roughly 60 GW of new renewable energy capacity by
249
2025, an amount equivalent to 4.7% of projected 2025 electricity
generation in the United States and fifteen percent of projected
250
electricity demand growth.
It is not thought to be practically
achievable to have the various RPS projects around the country
251
install the required additional 60 GW of new generation.
The
congested and limited state of transmission infrastructure to move
renewable power from generation site to market causes some to state
244. Neal J. Cabral, The Role of Renewable Portfolio Standards in the Context of a National
Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 13, 13 (2007-08).
245. Id. at 14 (quoting conclusions of Australian government study).
246. Id. at 15.
247. Id.
248. Quin Shea, Let's Keep Timetables Realistic in Moving Toward a Low-Carbon Electricity
Future, ELECTRICITY J., April 2008, at 80.
249. Wiser & Barbose, supra note 106, at 1.
250. Id.
251. Tiernan, supra note 147, at 7.
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that these requirements cannot be achieved within specified time
252
frames.
Therefore, with the underachievement of tax incentives, state
subsidy programs, and state RPS requirements, thought has recently
turned to a third alternative, feed-in tariffs for renewable power
development. Feed-in tariffs have been used by various foreign
countries and are being considered by several U.S. states. As
additional states experiment with European-type feed-in tariffs,
discussed below, it becomes crucially important to understand the
legal implications and legality of a feed-in tariff model implemented
in the United States at the state level.
However, this option may not be legal under U.S. constitutional
law.
VI. FEED-IN TARIFFS AS THE ALTERNATIVE RENEWABLE POWER
MECHANISM
A. Feed- in Tariffs Internationally
Feed-in tariffs are the most widely employed renewable energy
253
policy in Europe and, increasingly, the rest of the world.
As of
2006, seventeen European Union countries, as well as Brazil,
Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Nicaragua, Norway, Sri Lanka,
Switzerland and Turkey all used feed-in tariffs to promote and
254
support renewable energy. In March of 2008, the Kenyan Ministry
of Energy proposed the adoption of feed-in tariffs for wind, biomass
255
and small-hydro resources.
A feed-in tariff establishes a secure contract for wholesale
electricity at a set price that results in a rate of return attractive to
256
Feed-in tariff structures are typically
investors and developers.
either fixed payments based on an electricity generator’s cost to
produce electricity, or as a fixed premium paid above the spot market
252. Id.
253. WILSON RICKERSON & ROBERT C. GRACE, THE HEINRICH BOLL FOUND., THE
DEBATE OVER FIXED PRICE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES: FALLOUT AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 1 (2007).
254. Id.
255. See KENYAN MINISTRY OF ENERGY, FEED-IN-TARIFFS POLICY FOR WIND, BIOMASS
AND SMALL HYDRO RESOURCE GENERATED ELECTRICITY (2008), available at http://
www.investmentkenya.com/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&gi
d=20.
256. See Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to Meet U.S.
Renewable Electricity Targets, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 73–74.
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257

or wholesale market price of electricity. These fixed payments are
long-term contracts for anywhere from five to thirty years in
258
duration.
Feed-in tariffs increase the price of certain renewable
technologies to an amount that is deemed administratively and
politically necessary to encourage their development. Feed-in tariffs
typically may exceed utility-avoided costs, and therefore are justified
only by their objectives and results, and not typically by accepted
ratemaking methodology, which aims to minimize prudent generating
259
costs.
Often fixed-payment feed-in rates and terms are
differentiated by technology and are based on the cost of deploying a
260
given renewable energy technology.
Feed-in tariffs for sale of
renewable power typically decline over time as the high front-end
capital costs of renewable energy are amortized and as the number of
261
installed systems increases.
Feed-in tariff laws usually also
guarantee interconnection for distributed generation and utility scale
262
projects.
Feed-in tariffs have been successful in encouraging
significant renewable energy development in nearly all of the
263
countries in which they have been deployed.
The high initial capital costs of permitting and construction can
hinder the development of renewable technologies, while feed-in
tariff price premiums can help to offset the risk associated with those
264
high capital costs.
Feed-in tariffs offer a fixed price long term
contract for payment from utility or electricity suppliers to the
265
wholesale renewable energy generator. The structure of a feed-in
257. Id. at 73.
258. ANNE HELD ET AL, FEED-IN SYSTEMS IN GERMANY, SPAIN AND SLOVENIA: A
COMPARISON
(2007),
available
at
http://www.feed-incooperation.org/wDefault_7/wDefault_7/download-files/research/ific_comparison_of_fitsystems_de_es_sl.pdf?WSESSIONID=a8b71b3dc0adcd1b2333c8fd143f5a36.
259. FERREY, supra note 17, § 5:9.
260. JANET L. SAWIN, NATIONAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS: POLICY LESSONS FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT & DIFFUSION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AROUND THE
WORLD 5 (2004), available at http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
Miguel/Sawin__2004__National_policy_instruments.pdf.
261. See id.
262. John Farrell, Feed in Tariffs in America: Driving the Economy with Renewable Energy
Policy
That
Works
6
(2009),
available
at
http://www.boell.de/downloads/
ecology/FIT_in_America_web.pdf (noting that under European feed-in tariffs, governments
“further require utilities to interconnect renewable energy projects on demand”).
263. HELD ET AL., supra note 258, at 4.
264. Jonathan A. Lesser & Xuejuan Su, Design of an Economically Efficient Feed-in Tariff
Structure for Renewable Energy Development, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 981(2008).
265. See Sawin, supra note 260, at 4.

Ferrey_final_cpcxns.doc

Winter 2010

FIRE AND ICE: WORLD RENEWABLE ENERGY

2/22/2010 9:33:43 AM

171

tariff can be either a long term payment based on the cost of
generation—including profit—or a premium added on to the
wholesale or spot-market price of electricity. So long as a generator
feeds power onto the grid, it is guaranteed a long-term contract at the
government mandated feed-in price for the renewable energy
commodity. A feed-in tariff also can be structured to reflect the
benefits that renewable energy sources provide that are not reflected
in traditional fossil fuel resource-based pricing structures, including
pollution costs, climate change costs, security costs, and future fossil
266
fuel cost-uncertainty.
Costs of a feed-in tariff are passed on to consumers by
purchasing energy suppliers and reflect a public policy decision to
increase the percentage of renewable electricity sources in use. There
are myriad reasons to increase the percentage of renewable energy in
a supply portfolio, including diversified domestic energy security,
greater energy independence from imported supplies, local job and
technology growth, reduction in pollution, and reduction of
267
environmental damage from fossil fuel-generated electricity.
The
European experience justifies feed-in tariffs as a cost-effective
technique, which promotes innovation and a healthy investment
268
environment for renewable energy technologies.
Germany, Denmark, and Spain, while only a small fraction of the
size of the United States in square miles, were responsible for fiftythree percent of total installed global wind power capacity between
269
1990 and 2005.
Denmark receives nearly 20% of its energy from
wind power; Germany receives 5% of its energy from wind power and
will meet its goal of 12.5% renewable electricity by 2009, a year
270
earlier than expected. Germany’s feed-in tariff program has created
one of the world’s largest solar energy markets, and Spain is close
271
The policy experience in Europe has also found feed-in
behind.
tariffs to be less risky, less costly, and more efficient than other types
of renewable incentives, such as RPSs or other minimum percentage
272
requirements.
These benefits have in turn led to increases in
266. See RICKERSON & GRACE, supra note 253.
267. ALAN NOGEE ET AL., POWERFUL SOLUTIONS: 7 WAYS TO SWITCH AMERICA TO
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY 4–12 (1999).
268. See id.; see also Pablo del Rio &Miguel Gual, An Integrated Assessment of the Feed-in
Tariff System in Spain, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 994 (2007).
269. RICKERSON & GRACE, supra note 253, at 9.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 10.
272. Id. at 11; see also Lesser & Su, supra note 264.
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domestic production and manufacturing of renewable technologies
and the creation of jobs in the renewable energy sector. For example,
Germany created 235,600 jobs in the renewable energy sector in 2006,
273
a fifty percent increase from 2004.
The solar energy market in
274
Germany has increased rapidly.
The European debate on renewable energy incentives has
considered both feed-in tariff policies and RPSs. According to
Rickerson and Grace, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
initially favored RPSs, while Germany, Spain, and other countries
275
favored feed-in tariffs.
Consequently, Germany has 200 times the
installed solar capacity and ten times the number of renewable energy
276
jobs created as the U.K. In Germany, the current debate is whether
the expense of feed-in tariffs is too high compared to what the public
277
is willing to support.
The average German electric bill has
278
increased by roughly $3 per month ( 1.45/month) over the period of
279
The German public has generally
feed-in tariff implementation.
supported the increase, especially since many individuals have taken
advantage of the incentives to install their own renewable energy
280
generation systems.
Overall, renewable energy installations saved
281
114 million tons of CO2 in Germany in 2007.
For the renewable energy developer, the feed-in tariff decreases
investment risk by guaranteeing an investor or developer a long-term
contract at a secured price with a return on investment of eight to
282
nine percent.
By contrast, RPS policies require developers and
273. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturchutz und Raktorsicherheit, Renewable
Energies Already Providing 236,000 Jobs in Germany in 2006 (Sept. 2007),
http://www.bmu.de/english/renewable_energy/downloads/doc/40338.php.
274. Mark Landler, Germany Debates Subsidies for Solar Industries, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2008, at C1.
275. See RICKERSON & GRACE, supra note 253, at 5, 8.
276. Ashley Seager, Green Power: Germany Sets Shining Example in Providing a Harvest
for the World: Thanks to Tariff Guarantees, Germany Has 200 Times as Much Solar Energy as
Britain, THE GUARDIAN, July 23, 2007, at 27.
277. See Landler, supra note 274.
278. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR UMWELT, NATURSCHUTZ UND RAKTORSICHERHEIT,
DEVELOPMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN GERMANY IN 2007 at 7 (2008), available at
http://download.inogate.org/Seminar%201516%20April%202008%20%93EE,%20DSM%20&
%20RES%94/DENA%20Documentation/background_paper_renewables_Germany_2007_en.p
df.
279. Seager, supra note 276, at 27.
280. See Landler, supra note 277.
281. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR UMWELT, NATURSCHUTZ UND RAKTORSICHERHEIT, supra
note 278, at 3.
282. Seager, supra note 276, at 27.
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investors to secure contracts, which may not be long-term, for energy
and for RECs. Finding long-term contracts for two commodities in
two different markets injects more risk for investors. Research by the
Fraunhofer Institut found that capital costs for renewable energy
investments are significantly lower in countries using feed-in tariffs
than in those countries using policies that create higher risks of future
283
return on investment.
The European Commission concluded that
feed-in tariffs are more effective than quota-based systems like
284
RPSs.
Feed-in tariffs feature government-established fixed prices.
Rickerson and Grace argue that feed-in tariffs create as much
competition as RPS REC policies—the competition is just directed
285
via a different mechanism. RPS policies create a market for RECs,
competitively rewarding renewable energy projects through the sale
price of RECs. Developers and investors want the REC to be priced
so as to fill the gap between what is needed to attract investors to the
sector via a healthy return on investment and the current wholesale
transaction price for the generator’s electricity alone.
Feed-in tariffs, however, set and guarantee higher electricity
rates; investors compete to build the most cost-effective renewable
energy projects and therefore receive the highest return on
investment. With feed-in tariffs, the government sets the price and
guarantees interconnection and contract security, while the market
determines the amount of renewable energy projects put into
operation at that price level. Feed-in tariffs, when successfully
implemented, create a race to produce the least expensive and most
efficient projects. The lower the project cost, the higher the return on
investment guaranteed by the feed-in tariff rates.
B. Feed-in Tariff Concepts Developed in the United States
Feed-in tariffs have not historically been sanctioned in the
United States. The most prevalent renewable energy policy enacted
286
by states is the RPS.
The two are similar to the extent that they
only qualify renewable power that is actually produced, contrary to
SBCs, which can subsidize all sorts of development ventures, whether
or not they ever produce renewable power. The feed-in tariff does
this by actually linking the renewable subsidy to the price paid for
283.
284.
285.
286.

HELD ET AL., supra note 258, at 26.
Id.
See RICKERSON & GRACE, supra note 253.
Rickerson et al., supra note 256, at 74.
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renewable power, while the RPS does this by creating a separate
tradable renewable attribute, or REC.
However, the momentum and impact of European feed-in tariff
policies have dwarfed RPS initiatives in the United States, and some
U.S. states have begun to propose legislation and adopt policies
287
similar to European feed-in tariffs.
The Solar Electric Power
Association issued a report in late 2008 urging utilities to adopt feed288
in tariffs, apparently oblivious to the legal pitfalls and ramifications
set forth in the next sections. As many as ten states have introduced
actual feed-in tariff legislation, while a handful of others are
considering feed-in tariff policies. In addition, a federal feed-in tariff
has been proposed by Representative Jay Inslee (D-Wash.).
1. Inslee’s Federal Proposal
In the spring of 2008, Congressman Inslee introduced federal
feed-in tariff legislation which would guarantee uniform
interconnection standards, provide for a mandatory twenty-year
purchase requirement, and set up rate recovery through a national
289
SBC. According to a recent analysis,
[u]nder the proposed law, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) would set standards for the priority
interconnection and transmission of power from new “renewable
energy facilities,” which include renewable energy facilities 20 MW
or less. The FERC and the states would then be required to
implement these standards within their own respective areas of
jurisdiction when renewable energy facility owners request
interconnection. The bill would then require all electric utilities in
the US to enter into fixed-rate, 20-year power purchase agreements
at the request of any new renewable energy facility owner. The
FERC would set minimum national [renewable energy payment]
rates at levels designed to provide for full cost recovery, plus a 10%
internal rate of return on investment, for commercialized
technologies under good resource conditions. [Renewable energy
payment] rates would be differentiated on the basis of energy
technology, the size of the system, and the year that the system was
placed in service. Utilities would earn any associated [Renewable
Energy Credits] (RECs) in order to help meet RPS requirements.
As with interconnection, the FERC and the states would each
287. Id.
288. Ethan Howland, Utilities, Solar Developers Should Seek New Procurement Approaches,
Report Says, ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, Dec. 15, 2008, at 28.
289. Jim Peirobon, US Rep. Inslee Introduces Renewable Energy Pricing Legislation, Bill
Tackles Viability of Federal Pricing Head-On, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, June 27,
2008,
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/story?id=52899;
Home
Energy
Generation Act, H.R.729, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
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implement the rules of the Inslee bill for all renewable energy
facilities that fall within their respective regulatory jurisdictions.
The bill would [further] facilitate cost recovery through a private
renewable energy utility organization (called, “RenewCorps”) that
would be independent, yet subject to FERC oversight. Utilities
would be reimbursed by RenewCorps for the additional cost of
their power purchases, plus all costs associated with
interconnection and network upgrades needed to accommodate
these new facilities. To reimburse utilities, RenewCorps would
raise revenues through a regionally partitioned national system
290
benefits charge on every electric customer in the US.

Inslee’s proposal combines feed-in tariffs with RPS and system
291
This
benefit charge concepts similar to state programs to date.
proposed legislative scheme allows a twenty-year tariff payment at
prescribed rates federally established and differentiated by
292
technology.
These payments would be linked to new, federally293
created RECs. There would also be linkage to a new federal system
294
Therefore, the federal scheme would co-opt
benefits charge.
several state concepts.
Inslee’s proposal amends the FPA and repeals section 210 of
295
PURPA. Facilities choosing the feed-in tariff would not be eligible
296
for other federal tax incentives or state RECs. Inslee has asserted
that the purpose of the bill is to create investment security for
297
Inslee has noted that there
renewable energy project developers.
are significant barriers to passing a national feed-in tariff statute,
including inequalities that could result from how federal funds are
298
allocated to individual states. The proposal has not yet advanced to
law.

290. WILSON RICKERSON ET AL, FEED-IN TARIFFS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE USA
– A POLICY UPDATE 12 (North Carolina Solar Center 2008).
291. See Home Energy Generation Act.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Renewable Energy Jobs and Security Act, H.R. 6401, 110th Cong. (2008).
297. Press Release, Jay Inslee, Representative, House Bill Would Guarantee Rates for
Clean-Energy Generators (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/
list/press/wa01_inslee/renewableenergypayments.shtml.
298. See WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., FEED-IN TARIFFS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE
USA—A POLICY UPDATE 11–14 (2008).
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2. State Legislative Action
There are several state feed-in tariff style incentives proposed
and on the horizon but not yet enacted. These are outlined below.
California – The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
299
established the California Solar Initiative.
This initiative is a
performance-based incentive where solar energy generators can
receive a five-year contract worth up to $0.39 per kWh for power
300
sold. The program is similar to a German-style feed-in tariff, but is
301
shorter in contract term and well below the rates in Germany. The
incentive amounts decrease over time after legislative targets for
302
installed solar capacity are met.
In February of 2008, the CPUC adopted the Onsite Renewable
Generation feed-in tariff, which provides a ten-, fifteen-, or twentyyear contract for renewable energy systems smaller than 1.5 MW in
303
capacity.
The contract price is based on the average cost of
electricity production, adjusted for the spot market and time of
304
There are three additional proposals in the
delivery value.
California legislature that would expand feed-in tariff options for
305
renewable energy generation.
In December 2008, “the presiding commissioners accepted the
California Energy Commission (CEC) staff’s recommendation that
306
California implement a system of feed-in tariffs.”
A final report
307
was prepared in 2009 for approval by the full CEC.
“The
recommendation calls on the Public Utility Commission to . . .
implement a system of feed-in tariffs for projects up to 20 MW in
308
size.”
The CEC also recommended that the CEC and CPUC
309
continue to evaluate feed-in tariffs for projects greater than 20 MW.

299. Cooler Planet, California Solar Power Rebates (Sept. 29, 2007), http://
solar.coolerplanet.com/Articles/california-solar-power-rebates.aspx.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 298, at 4.
304. See id.
305. See id. app. at 18.
306. Paul Gipe, CEC Recommends Cost-Based Feed-in Tariff, WIND WORKS, Jan. 5, 2009,
http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/USA/CECRecommendsCost-BasedFeed-inTariff.html.
307. KEMA, CALIFORNIA FEED-IN TARIFF DESIGN AND POLICY OPTIONS: FINAL
CONSULTANT REPORT 5 (2009).
308. Id.
309. Id.
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Hawaii – The 2007 legislative session in Hawaii saw four
310
proposals for feed-in tariffs. The bills were not approved, however,
311
and must be reintroduced in the 2009 session.
Three of the
proposals sought to establish twenty-year contracts at a rate of $0.70
per kWh for solar systems up to twenty MW in capacity, and the
312
other proposal set the rate at $0.45 per kWh. The bills would only
have applied the feed-in tariff rates to excess electricity from net313
metered systems.
Michigan – Michigan House Bill No. 5218, the “Michigan
Renewable Energy Sources Act,” was introduced on September 15,
314
2007. This bill provides that electric utilities must enter into power
purchase agreements for a term of not less than twenty years, and
must purchase all electricity from eligible electric generators in the
state at the rate needed for development plus a reasonable profit, but
315
not less than specified rates. These rates are the same as Germany’s
316
and would be the highest in North America. These rates are:
 $0.10 per kWh for electricity from hydroelectric projects
less than 500 kW;
 $0.145 per kWh for electricity from biogas projects less
than 150 kW;
 $0.19 per kWh for electricity from geothermal projects
less than five MW;
 $0.65 per kWh for electricity from rooftop solar
installations less than thirty kW;
 $0.71 per kWh for electricity from solar cladding less than
thirty kW;
 $0.105 per kWh for electricity from commercial wind
projects; and
317
 $0.25 per kWh for electricity from small wind turbines.
The Michigan bill has been referred to committee and is on hold
318
while Renewable Portfolio options are being considered.
Support

310. RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 301, at 8.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. H.B. 5218, 2007–08 Leg. Sess. (MI. 2007).
315. Id.
316. See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy: News, First Feed-in
Law Proposed in Michigan (September 24, 2007), http://www.eere.energy.gov/states/
news_detail.cfm/news_id=11316.
317. Id.

Ferrey_final_cpcxns.doc

178

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/22/2010 9:33:43 AM

Vol. 20:125

for the bill exists in the House, but there seems to be opposition in
319
the Senate.
Illinois – Illinois sought to adopt a program similar to the
320
Michigan proposal in December of 2007.
However, the bill, HB
5855, was instead amended to provide only solar generators a net321
metering rate of 200% the retail rate for electricity. The proposal
would also allow utilities to enter into twenty-year contracts with
322
renewable energy generators. The bill could be introduced as part
323
of a net-metering bill in the next legislative session.
Minnesota – State Representative David Bly introduced bill
324
HF3537. The bill is similar to the Michigan proposal, except that in
order to receive the incentive, the generators must be majority-owned
by Minnesota residents, limited liability companies, non-profits,
325
governments, tribal councils, or electric cooperatives. This language
has dormant commerce clause implications as well as the PURPA
implications discussed below. The measure was opposed by utilities
326
and did not make it out of the House.
Rhode Island – In 2008 a bill was introduced which was similar to
the Michigan bill, offering a twenty-year contract at rates that vary
327
depending on the capacity of the generator.
For example, wind
energy projects between 20 and 50 MW receive $0.105 per kWh and
328
systems under twenty MW receive $0.115 per kWh.
Other
technologies receive rates 1.15 times the avoided cost rates. The bill
329
is still being negotiated.
3. Other States Considering Feed-in Tariffs
Florida – In December 2008, the Gainesville, Florida City
Commission approved a tariff of $0.32 per kWh under Gainesville

318. See RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 301, at 5.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 6.
322. Id. at 18 app.1.
323. Id. at 6.
324. See RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 301, at 6.
325. Id. at 6 n.9.
326. Charley Shaw, 2008 in Review, ST. PAUL LEGAL LEDGER, Jan. 15, 2009, http://
www.legal-ledger.com/item.cfm?recID=11320.
327. RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 301, at 16 app. 1.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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330

Regional Utilities’ proposed feed-in tariff program.
The program
331
The
pays both residential and business customers the $0.32 rate.
332
city launched the program in March of 2009.
Indiana – State Representative Matt Pierce introduced HB 1622,
333
the “Advanced Renewable Energy Tariffs Act,” into the Indiana
334
General Assembly in January 2009. The bill received first reading
335
336
on January 16, 2009. HB 1622 is patterned after the Michigan bill.
Vermont – In 2008, the Vermont Sustainably Priced Energy
Enterprise Development Program was amended to allow projects less
than one MW in capacity to enter into contracts fifteen years in
337
length, at prices adequate to promote renewable resources.
This
program could be developed into a feed-in tariff if the contract rates
338
are high enough to promote renewable resource development. So
while the legislation has been enacted, it is not formally a feed-in
tariff, although it has the potential to perform as one.
Wisconsin – The Governor’s Task Force on Global Warming
recommended adopting an advanced renewable tariff for projects 15
339
MW in capacity and smaller. The rates recommended are cost plus
340
Wisconsin’s Public Service Commission opened a
profit rates.
further investigation of Advanced Renewable Tariff Development,
341
essentially the feed-in tariff, in January of 2009.
It becomes more important to understand the legal implications
of a feed-in tariff structure as it is being increasingly considered in the
330. Paul Gipe, Gainesville Moves Rapidly to True Solar Tariff, WIND WORKS, Jan. 5, 2009,
http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/USA/GainesvilleMovesRapidlyToTrueSolarTariff.html.
331. Ucilia Wang, Budget Shortfalls Could Shrink States’ Solar Incentives,
GREENTECHSOLAR, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/budgetshortfalls-could-shrink-states-solar-incentives-5524/.
332. Id.
333. H.B. 1622, 116th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., (Ind. 2009), available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2009/PDF/IN/IN1622.1.pdf.
334. Paul Gipe, Indiana Rep. Introduces Feed Law Bill & Wisconsin PSC Opens Docket on
Renewable
Tariffs,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM,
Jan.
21,
2009,
http://
www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/01/indiana-rep-introduces-feed-law-billwisconsin-psc-opens-docket-on-renewable-tariffs-54546.
335. H.B. 1622.
336. Gipe, supra note 334.
337. RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 301, at 10.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 11.
340. Id.
341. Paul Gipe, Wisconsin PSC Opens Docket on Renewable Tariffs, WINDWORKS, Jan. 16,
2009,
http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/USA/WisconsinPSCOpensDocketonRenewable
Tariffs.html.
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United States. With a federalist system, especially for electric power,
there are bright jurisdictional lines between state and federal legal
authority over these transactions.
C. Federal Preemption of State Authority for Wholesale Rates
Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA empower FERC to regulate
rates for the interstate and wholesale sale and transmission of
342
electricity. In doing so, the act bestows upon FERC broad power to
shape the energy market and affect all stakeholders: generators,
retailers, and consumers. The act creates a “bright line” between
state and federal jurisdiction with wholesale power sales falling on the
343
affirmative federal side of the line, and FERC jurisdiction preempts
state regulation of wholesale power transactions and prices.
Where federal law occupies the field and there is evidence of a
pervasive federal scheme in a given area, by inference, courts will
find state or local legislation preempted . . . . Even where there is
no congressional intent evident to federally occupy a field, the
conflict principle requires that a court strike inconsistent state or
local law. State regulation is not allowed to veto the regulatory
scheme of a superior level of government. Correspondingly, courts
hold that where state and federal laws complement each other,
344
there is no preemption.
342. Federal Regulation and Development of Power (“Federal Power Act”), 16 U.S.C. §§
824d–e.
343. Id. at 1066, aff’d, Morgan Stanley Capital Group v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
County, Wash, 128 S.Ct. 2733 (2008). The Supreme Court in its decision criticized the reasoning
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, but nonetheless agreed with and upheld the
FERC has exclusive authority, and responsibility, to review long-term power crises, wholesale
market manipulation by a party to the power sale contract that would negate existing contract
protections, and wholesale rates. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, 128 S.Ct. at 2749. The
Supreme Court criticized the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit instituting a rate “zone of
reasonableness” on FERC determinations, which would be “a reinstitution of cost-based rather
than contract-based regulation.” Id. at 2748. The Court did not want to impose this cost
calculation burden on FERC regarding every market-based contract. Id. at 2749. The 5-2
decision by Justice Scalia upheld the tougher “public interest” standard to only abrogate
contracts in those “extraordinary circumstances where the public will be severely harmed,” as
articulated by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, with a new affirmative twist regarding market
manipulation. Id. The FERC was told to “amplify or clarify its findings. Id. at 2750. Market
turmoil or chaos, even rendering a power market dysfunctional, alone are not sufficient to
negate existing wholesale power contracts, which are designed, in part, to hedge against certain
market risks. Of the four wholesale contracts at issue in this litigation, one with Dynegy had
already expired by its terms at the time of this Supreme Court 2008 decision, and three with
Shell, PPM and Sempra had not yet terminated. For a discussion of the California and Western
energy crisis that spawned this litigation, see Steven Ferrey, Soft Paths, Hard Choices:
Environmental Lessons in the Aftermath of California’s Electric Deregulation Debacle, 23 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 251 (2004).
344. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 113–14.
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The North American power grid is composed of many individual
pieces owned by the local transmission companies, which operate
under the overlapping jurisdiction of fifty-five state and provincial
government agencies, as well as three national regulatory
authorities. [Within the United States,] FERC regulates entirely
wholesale power transactions. The Federal Power Act defines
“sale at wholesale” as any sale to any person for resale. FERC also
regulates power generation to a limited degree, power transmission
345
in interstate commerce, and interstate power sales.

FERC jurisdiction is plenary and extends to all sales in interstate
346
commerce. FERC does not regulate the local distribution of power,
power solely in intrastate commerce, or the self-generation and use of
347
power.
There is no statutorily or judicially imposed threshold amount of
interstate sale of power, which triggers FERC jurisdiction.
Although the amount of power an electric utility may place in
interstate commerce is de minimis compared to the same utility’s
sales in intrastate commerce, FERC may assert its regulatory
authority over such a utility. If a small amount of interstate power
is commingled with intrastate power, the entire amount of power
becomes “interstate” for purposes of vesting FERC with the
authority to exercise jurisdiction.
Once FERC exercised
jurisdiction over a utility, the entire wholesale structure of the
348
entity’s operations becomes subject to FERC regulation.

There is no doubt that renewable power sales are designed to
affect (1) wholesale power transactions and (2) interstate power
transactions.
Both of these are subject to exclusive federal
jurisdiction; state authority is preempted. Recent jurisprudence has
accentuated the exclusivity of FERC’s power in not only setting “just
and reasonable rates” but also exclusively ensuring the performance
of the energy market. As the Ninth Circuit has remarked, and the
Supreme Court confirmed, when combined with federal preemption
precedent, energy market regulatory reforms have contributed to “a
massive shift in regulatory jurisdiction from the states to the FERC.”
349

345. Ferrey, supra at note 68, at 164.
346. N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 344 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 1984).
347. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 523 (1945); City of
Batavia v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 672 F.2d 64, 68 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that
the FERC regulates wholesale transactions and states regulate retail transactions).
348. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 109–10.
349. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1066; see also Entergy La., Inc., v. La. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003) (noting that the filed rate doctrine applies to the states through
federal preemption).
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D. The Filed-Rate Doctrine
If a utility or independent power producer is subject to FERC
jurisdiction and regulation, state regulation of the same operational
aspects is preempted as a matter of federal law. Principles of
preemption require a state regulatory agency to accept and pass
through in retail rates all cost items deemed by FERC to be “just
and reasonable,” and which are otherwise allowed. Therefore, a
FERC determination regarding any aspect of a wholesale price is
universally binding.
The so-called “filed-rate doctrine” holds that state regulatory
commissions may not second-guess or overrule on any grounds a
wholesale rate determination made pursuant to federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in 1986 and again in 1988 [and 2003], upheld
350
the filed-rate doctrine.

In their 2003 decision, the Supreme Court clarified that there is
little residual “prudency” authority, as initially supposed by some
states, reserving a state role in determining the ultimate choice of
351
certain suppliers in wholesale power market transactions.
This final point is important. Until 2003, some states presumed
that the Pike County prudency concept, which recognized utility cost
recovery for imprudent decision making, would allow a state to
determine from whom power should prudently be obtained, and
would allow states to modify or overrule FERC-approved wholesale
market orders or rules—under the guise of supervising the prudent
352
operation of the integrated power markets in their states.
This
theory of residual authority to overrule company allocation of costs
353
was deflated by the Supreme Court in its 2003 Entergy opinion. The
Court found that states are unable to tamper, directly or indirectly,
with wholesale market operations approved by a FERC order or
354
operating subject to FERC-approved tariffs.
States’ deliberate
attempts to design renewable power or carbon regulation (such as
RGGI regulations) to tilt the wholesale market operation, power
pricing, and dispatch order in wholesale markets operating pursuant
to FERC-approved tariffs runs counter to the 2003 opinion of the
Supreme Court in Entergy.

350. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 114–15.
351. Entergy La., 539 U.S. at 39.
352. See Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pa Pub. Util. Comm’n, 465 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa.
Comm. Ct. 1983).
353. Entergy La., 539 U.S. at 49.
354. Id. at 47.
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Pursuant to the filed-rate doctrine, the filed federal rate becomes
355
Outside the regulatory scheme, the filed rate
“the legal rate.”
cannot be attacked on the grounds that it was the result of improper
356
conduct.
“[T]he filed rate doctrine bars all claims – state and
federal – that attempt to challenge the terms of a tariff that a federal
357
agency has reviewed and filed.”
Bad conduct or wrongdoing by a party does not set aside the
358
filed-rate doctrine. FERC adoption of market-based rates in a state
359
does not obviate the filed-rate doctrine. Pursuant to EP Act 2005,
FERC codified new anti-fraud rules for natural gas and electricity
markets in Order No. 670, covering schemes to defraud, make untrue
statements of a material fact or omit material facts, or to engage in
360
any fraud or deceit upon any entity. Despite these new anti-fraud
rules, even an “unlawful” act of fraud does not negate the filed-rate
361
doctrine. FERC, through the regulatory scheme, is the only party
362
that has a remedy when fraud has been committed. Any conflicting
363
state determinations are barred.
Feed-in tariff rates above avoided cost result in at least a
temporary, and perhaps longer, increased cost of electricity. And
here lies the conundrum: Does this conflict with either the
requirements of PURPA, which are part of the FPA, or the general

355. Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 256 (1951); Keogh v. Chi.
& Nw. Ry, 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922).
356. Ark. La Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577–78 (1981).
357. People of Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, 375 F.3d 831, 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal
citations omitted); see also Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d
918, 929 (9th Cir. 2002).
358. See e.g., Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163 (1922) (“The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be
varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.”); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier
Tariff Bur., 476 U.S. 409, 417 (1986) (hearing challenge to collusion to set higher rates);
Wegoland, Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no fraud
exception to filed rate doctrine); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 492 (8th Cir. 1992)
(reasoning that intentional misconduct of a party is not an exception to filed rate doctrine).
359. See Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 853.
360. FERC Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 114 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047 (2006).
361. See e.g., Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 20 (noting that while plaintiffs “ argue that there should
be an exception to the filed rate doctrine when there are allegations of fraud . . . every court that
has considered the plaintiffs’ argument has rejected the notion that there is a fraud exception to
the filed rate doctrine”).
362. Taffett v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir 1992); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of
Snohomish, County Wash. v. Dynergy Power Mktg Inc., 384 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2004).
363. In re: Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, Slip Op., Case 2:03cv-01431-PMP-PAL MDL-1566, May 15, 2008.
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364

rate-setting requirements of FERC under the FPA?
A series of
court decisions over the past two decades makes this a very
appropriate question under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.
PURPA was designed to promote renewables while protecting
consumers from artificially increasing costs of electricity resulting
365
therefrom.
The promotion of renewable energy is premised on
renewable energy generators receiving only the utility’s average
366
avoided cost.
Thus, retail energy consumers should be indifferent
to the amount of renewable power purchased at these rates, because
the rates are identical to the utility’s costs. PURPA, therefore,
specifically provides that no rule requiring a utility to purchase energy
from a QF “shall provide for a rate which exceeds the incremental
367
cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy.”
“Alternative” in this context does not refer to renewable energy
sources but rather to electricity produced by any generator but that
utility.
Congressional hearings emphasized the use of avoided cost
methodologies to determine the cost of acquiring alternative electric
power, and showed the desire that no particular electricity producer
368
would subsidize the inefficiency of another.
These congressional
hearings also illustrated that Congress’ intent was to avoid promoting
alternative energy sources beyond the point of cost-effectiveness.
This desire was evident in both the House and Senate. During
hearings on PURPA, Senator Percy stated that “[i]t would be wrong
to subsidize small [power] producers at the expense of other
369
customers.”
“Senator Durkin added during floor debate that

364. Federal Regulation and Development of Power (“Federal Power Act”), 16 U.S.C. 824a
(2006).
365. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 17.
366. Federal Regulation and Development of Power (“Federal Power Act”), 16 U.S.C. §
824a-3(b) (2006) (providing that a rate may not “exceed[] the incremental cost to the electric
utility of alternative electric energy”); 18 C.F.R. 292.304(a)(2) (providing that no electric utility
shall “pay more than the avoided costs for purchases”).
367. See Windway Techs., Inc v. Midland Power Coop., 2001 WL 1248741 at *4 (N.D. Iowa
2001) (quoting .16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)).
368. Miles, supra note 73, at 1284 n.99 (citing Public Utility Rate Proposals of President
Carter's Energy Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and
Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1,
at 189 (1977)).
369. Id. at 1285 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 25,848 (1977) (statement of Sen. Percy)).
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utilities should be required to set purchase rates for hydroelectric
370
generators at cost, rather than at a subsidized rate.”
1. The Green Energy Limited Exemption
Only two very limited exceptions legally allow utilities to pay in
excess, or to have states mandate that utilities pay in excess, of
avoided costs to a QF for renewable energy produced and delivered.
The first exception applies when the excess cost is for a Green Energy
Program in which utility customers individually voluntarily agree to
371
higher rates covering the costs above the utility’s avoided cost. A
cost-recovering and appropriately-priced green electricity purchase
would likely be prohibitively expensive to many consumers,
372
compared to the rates for conventional purchase of electricity. For
example, voluntary programs consisting of RPS-eligible RECs and
future RECs can vary in cost from $0.014 per kWh to, in
373
Massachusetts, $0.50 per kWh.
2. The Net Metering Exemption
The second exception applies to net metering. On March 28,
2001, FERC held that state net metering decisions were not
preempted by federal law, because no sale occurs when an individual
homeowner, farmer, or similar entity installs distributed generation
and accounts for its dealings with the utility through the practice of
374
netting.
FERC deemed that a transfer of title to power does not
375
constitute a “sale.”
Oregon has gone even further. The Oregon Public Utilities
Commission (OPUC) in 2008, ruled that its RPS program applies to
an entity that: generates renewable power; is located on the customer370. Id.
371. The Florida Public Service Commission found that a Green-Pricing program does not
violate PURPA and its implementing rules. However, the Florida PSC made it clear that the
Commission did not answer the question of whether circumstances might exist where prices in
excess of avoided cost could be borne by the general body of ratepayers, or the question of the
amount the utility or its green electricity customers could pay. In re Fla. Power & Light Co., 219
P.U.R.4th 46, 49 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2002).
372. A state feed-in tariff program could be implemented as a “green electricity” purchase
but would have to include RECs in those half of the states that have them and fit into state
regulatory structures, such as existing renewable portfolio standard regulations. Voluntary
programs; however, would not likely create the aggressive investment market climate desired by
a feed-in tariff due to uncertainty that a voluntary program could be discontinued at any time.
373. NSTAR Green, supra note 236.
374. Steven Ferrey, Net Metering, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA. OF ENERGY ENGINEERING AND
TECH. 1096, 1098 (Barney L Capehart ed., 2007).
375. Id.
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generator’s premises; can operate in parallel with an electric utility’s
existing transmission and distribution facilities; and is intended
primarily to offset some of the customer-generator’s own electricity
376
requirements. OPUC held that a customer-generator need not be
both a customer and a generator. The “customer-generator” label
could apply to a customer who hired a third party to own or install
and operate on the customer’s premises a self-generation unit that
377
No limitation was placed on
supplied power behind the meter.
third-party ownership, and the sale of such power to the customergenerator was not deemed to be a regulated retail sale of power,
because FERC took the position that, under federal law, net metering
does not necessarily involves a sale. Thus, because the net-metered
transaction between the customer-generator and the utility is not a
sale at all, the prior sale from the third-party to the customer378
generator was not a “sale for resale.”
The regulated utility is not
required in any manner to determine who owns net-metered
379
facilities. If the renewable net-metered facility takes advantage of
multiple federal and state trust fund subsidies and tax credits and
380
benefits, it is still eligible for net metering. The third-party owner of
the renewable generation equipment can still collect RECs associated
381
with the sale of power from the net-metered facility. The ability to
quadruple-dip into RECs, net metering, tax incentives, and system
benefit trust funds or other subsidies is not uniformly allowed in the
382
states.
Eighty percent of the states have electively adopted “net
metering,” which runs the retail utility meter backwards when a
383
renewable energy generator puts power back to the grid.
Net

376. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., Order No. 08-388 at 4–5 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n July 31, 2008),
available at http://apps.puc.state.or.us/orders/2008ords/08-388.pdf (interpreting the definition of
a net metering facility under ORS 757.300(1)(d)).
377. Id. at 7–8.
378. Id. at 10. The Commission relied on the FERC determination in In re Mid-America
Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, 62,263 (2001). The Oregon Commission also held that the third-party
owner of the net metered generator was not a retail electric service provider under state law
because it offered does not generally offer service other than to selected on-premises parties,
did not used the utility’s distribution system, and did not provide any ancillary services. It also
was not a utility and did not have to serve 100 percent of premises load. The regular public
utility must serve all other power and back-up needs of the customer. Id.
379. Honeywell Int’l, supra note 376, at 18.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 19.
382. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 110, at 24.
383. Ferrey, supra note 3748, at 1096.
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metering can pay the eligible renewable energy source approximately
four times more for this power when it rolls backwards at the retail
rate than paid to any other independent power generators for
wholesale power, and much more than the time-dependent value of
384
this power to the purchasing utility.
The state positions on net
metering are set forth in Table 6.
Table 6: STATE NET METERING REGULATIONS385
State

Eligible

Eligible

Size

Technologies

Customers

Limitations

Price

Authorization

Excess*

Ariz. Corp.

purchased at

Comm.

avoided cost

Decision No.

Limits
Arizona

Renewables &

< 100 kW

cogeneration

52345
California

Solar and wind

Residential

< 10 kW

Excess

Calif. Pub.

and Small

purchased at

Util. Code

Commercial

avoided cost;

§2827

month-tomonth
carryover
allowed
w/utility
consent
Colorado

All resources

< 10 kW

Excess carried

Pub. Svc. Co.

over month-

of Colo.,

to-month

Advice Letter
1265;
Decision
C96-901

Connecticut

Renewables &

< 50 kW for

Excess

Dept. of Pub.

cogeneration

cogeneration;

purchased at

Util/ Control,

< 100 kW for

avoided cost

Order No.

renewables

384. Id.
385. Id. at 1098–1100.

159
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Renewables &

Residential

Excess

ID PUC

cogeneration

and small

purchased at

Orders Nos.

commercial

avoided cost

16025 (1980);
26750 (1997)

Indiana

Renewables &

< 1,000

Excess is

170 IN

cogeneration

kWh/month

“granted” to

Admin. Code

the utility; No

§4-4, 1-7

purchase of
excess
Iowa

Renewables

No size limit

Excess

Iowa Util.

purchased at

Bd., Utilities

avoided cost

Division Rule
§15.11(5)

Maine

Renewables &

< 100 kW

cogeneration

Excess

Me. PU Code

purchased at

Ch. 36,

avoided cost

§§1(A)(18),
(19), §4(C)(4)

Maryland

Solar

Residential

< 80 kW

Excess carried

Maryland

over to

Art. 78, §54M

following
month
Massachusetts

Renewables &

< 60 kW =

Excess

Mass. Gen.

cogeneration

Class I

purchased at

Laws c. 164,

Between 60

avoided cost

§1G(g);

kW and 1

D.T.E. Order

MW = Class

97-111 Note:

II

< 30 kW 220

Between 1-2

CMR

MW = Class

§8.04(2)

III386
Minnesota

Renewables &

< 40 kW

cogeneration

Excess

Minn. Stat.

purchased at

§261B.164(3)

“average retail
utility energy
rate”
Nevada

Solar and wind

< 10 kW

Excess

Nev. R. Stat.

purchased at

Ch. 704

386. The recent Green Communities Act in Massachusetts provides for Class I, II, III,
neighborhood, solar and wind net metering facilities with wind and solar up to 2 MW allowed to
net meter. Green Communities Act, S. No. 2768, 185th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007).
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avoided cost;
annualization
allowed
New Hampshire

Solar, wind &

< 25 kW

hydro

PUC may
require
‘netting’ over
12-month
period;
retailing
wheeling
allowed for up
to 3 customers

New Mexico

Renewables,

Excess

NM PUC

fuel cells, micro

< 1,000 kW

credited to

Order 2847

turbines

following

(11/30/98)

month; unused
credit is
granted to
utility at end
of 12-month
period
New York

Solar

Residential

< 10 kW

Excess

NY Public

credited to

Service Stat.

following

§66-j

month; unused
credit is
granted to
utility at end
of 12-month
period
North Dakota

Renewables &

< 100 kW

cogeneration

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania

Excess

N.D. Admin.

purchased at

Code §69-09-

avoided cost

07-09

Renewables &

< 100 kW and

Excess is

Ok.

cogeneration

annual output

“granted” to

Corporations

< 25,000 kWh

the utility; no

Comm.

purchase of

Schedule QF-

Renewables

< 50 kW

excess

2

Excess

PECO Rate

purchased at

R-S, Supp. 5

wholesale rate

to PA Tariff
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PUC No. 2,
Page 43A
Rhode Island

Renewables &

< 25 kW for

Excess

PUC Supp.

cogeneration

larger

purchased at

Decision and

utilities;

avoided cost

Order,

< 15 kW for

Docket No.

smaller

1549

utilities
Texas

Vermont

Renewables

< 50 kW

Excess

Texas PUC,

purchased at

Rule

avoided cost

§23.66(f)(4)

Solar, wind,

Residential,

<15 kW,

Excess carried

Reuse of Net

fuel cells using

commercial,

except

over month-

Metering, VT.

renewable fuel,

and

< 100 kW for

to-month; any

PSB Docket

anaerobic

agricultural

anaerobic

residual excess

No. 6181

digestion

customers

digesters

at end of year

(April 21,

is “granted” to

1999)

the utility
Washington

Solar, wind and

< 25 kW

hydropower

Excess
credited to
following
month; unused
credit is
granted to
utility at end
of 12-month
period

Wisconsin

All Resources

All retail

< 20 kW

customers

Excess

Pub. Svc.

purchased at

Comm.

retail rate for

Schedule PG-

renewables,

4

avoided cost
for nonrenewables
Connecticut

Solar, wind,

Residential

No size limit

Not specified

CT Public

hydro, fuel cell,

Act 98-28

sustainable

(1998)

biomass
Illinois (pending)

Solar and wind

All retail
customers

< 40 kW

Excess carried

Ill. Legis. S.B.

over month-

1228

to-month; any
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residual excess
at end of year
is purchased at
avoided cost
Maine

< 100 kW

Excess carried

Me. PU Code

other

over month-

Ch. §313

applicable

to-month; any

(1998); PUC

technology

residual excess

Order No.

at end of 12-

98-621

month period

(December

is eliminated

19, 1998). [35-

Renewables or

A MRSA
§3210(2)(C)]
Puerto

Rico

Renewables

Residential

(pending)

< 50 kW

Excess carried
over monthto-month; any
residual excess
at end of year
is purchased at
avoided cost

*“Excess” refers to the “net excess generation” of electricity by the customer-generator (i.e.,
generation exceeds consumption) during the billing period.

By turning the meter backwards, net metering effectively
compensates the generator at the full retail rate for transferring just
the wholesale energy commodity. While most states compensate the
generator for excess generation at the avoided cost or marketdetermined wholesale rate, as Table 7 below shows, some states
compensate the wholesale energy seller for the excess at the much
higher retail rate.
“[E]lectricity is a unique energy form: It cannot be stored or
conserved with any efficiency. Therefore, electricity has substantially
different value at different hours of the day, different seasons of the
387
year, and at different places in the utility system.”
Contrary to this physical reality, net metering and billing treats all
power [at all hours] as being tangibly storable [or bankable] and
having equal value, when in fact it is not and does not. By ignoring
interim actual physical transfers of power occurring at all the
minutes and hours of the month, and recognizing only the net
balance of the transactions at the end of the month or quarter, net
metering assumes all electricity generated and transmitted has
equal [average] value.
387. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 119.
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It is even possible to “game” the system with net metering—selling
power to the utility at the netted average retail price in off-peak
late evening hours when the customer/generator has no need for
the power . . . and the utility has surplus power . . . . Other utility
388
ratepayers will be left to make up the revenue deficit that occurs.

Thus,
[h]ow states treat net energy generation (NEG) is one of the more
controversial aspects of net metering. NEG is the net surplus of
electricity sold to the utility compared to electricity purchased from
the utility over a given (typically monthly) billing period. Some
states allow any such surplus to be carried over as a credit against
the next month, with some limiting the duration of this carry-over
to a year. At the end of the year, the surplus is either forfeited to
the utility, or to low-income energy assistance programs
administered by the utility (which effectively pay the utility bill of
customers who have not paid). Still, other programs allow the
389
customer to receive cash for the NEG.

The net metering statuses of representative northeast states are
set forth in Table 7.
Table 7: Seven Northeast State Net Metering Rules390
State

Eligible

Eligible

Technology

Customers Limits

Size Limits

Net Energy
Generation (NEG)
Reconciliation

Connecticut

Renewables,

Commercial and

•50kW

NEG purchased @

MSW

residential

cogeneration

avoided cost

cogeneration and

customers

•100kW

fuel cells
Maine

renewables

Renewables,

All customer

MSW and fuel

classes

•100kW

Credited forward
monthly; annual

cells

NEG granted to
utilities

Maryland

Renewables

Commercial,

•500kW

Monthly

residential and

NEG granted to

schools

utilities
(in flux)

388. Id. at 119–20.
389. Ferrey, supra note 383, at 1098.
390. Id. at 1098-1100.
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Table 7: Seven Northeast State Net Metering Rules390
State

Eligible

Eligible

Technology

Customers Limits

Size Limits

Net Energy
Generation (NEG)
Reconciliation

Massachusetts

MSW,

All customer

< 60 kW = Class I

Monthly NEG

renewables, and

classes

Between 60 kW

credited forward

cogeneration

and 1 MW = Class
II
Between 1-2 MW
= Class III391

New Jersey

Renewables and

Residential and

fuel cells

commercial

Biogas, wind,

Agricultural and

solar PV

residential only

•2MW

Annualized NEG
purchased at
avoided cost

New York

10-400kW

Monthly credited
forward; Annualized
NEG purchased at
avoided cost

Rhode Island

Renewables,

All customer

•25kW (up to

Monthly NEG

MSW and fuel

classes

1MW in

credited forward;

Narragansett

Annual NEG

service territory)

granted to utilities

cells

3. Legally Reconciling Feed-in Tariffs
PURPA regulations require that a utility purchase energy from
392
qualifying QF renewable energy sources at avoided cost. One way
around PURPA might be for surplus payments to be made to the
producer based on the capacity, availability, or fact of contract
production, not based on the actual quantity of electricity. However,
393
with some regions now making explicit forward capacity payments,
even this would draw legal scrutiny. Electricity from a QF must be

391. The recent Green Communities Act, S. No. 2768, 185th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007),
provides for Class I, II, III, neighborhood, solar and wind net metering facilities with wind and
solar up to 2 MW allowed to net meter.
392. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a) (2006).
393. The Independent System Operator of New England awards forward capacity payments
through an annual auction and reconfiguration auctions for supplying capacity to the system.
See ISO New England, Forward Capacity markets, http://www.isone.com/markets/
othrmkts_data/fcm/index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
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purchased at the purchasing utility’s avoided cost rate.
A
“performance-based incentive” could operate like a theoretical feedin tariff, but could be a separate payment from the power purchase
made by the utility either with or without net metering. If the
payment were a subsidy and not a long-term energy contract, it could
possibly get around the avoided cost ceiling under PURPA. A utility
or ratepayer, however, could argue that the requirement acts like an
energy contract at inflated prices. Ultimately, a semantic difference
may not be enough to survive a constitutional challenge.
A seller of power can be paid appreciably more for its power
under a net-metered purchase, as described above, than through a
non-net-metered purchase, which increases the price above avoided
cost in the same way that feed-in tariffs do. Under some state net
metering systems, states can require utilities to pay for net-metered
wholesale electricity sales at retail rates, which are significantly above
394
the avoided cost rates (which reflect wholesale rates).
The excess
power, even if transferred back against the utility’s wishes, is not a
“sale” if the state so determines under net metering rules, and power
used on-site is also not a “sale” under the concept that only the net
value at the end of the billing period reflects the actual net metered
395
sale.
Incentives to promote renewable energy that do not fall under
PURPA include RPSs, taxes on fossil fuel generation, and tax
incentives available to utilities buying renewable energy. These types
of renewable energy incentives could be classified as non-rate
mechanisms, and therefore would not be subject to maximum avoided
396
cost PURPA restrictions on wholesale power sale prices. The EP
Act of 2005 and existing state regulations related to reliability and
distribution might allow for certain methods of utility cost-recovery
through a distribution charge, as FERC does not have authority to
regulate local distribution charges. However, this would have to be
cleverly structured to pass muster. Production could be metered by
the utility, through an automated production tracking system, or
397
through self-reporting.

394. See MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. AA3173, 3195, 3196 (Iowa Dist.
Ct. May 25, 1999).
395. Id.
396. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 105.
397. See Renewable Energy Trust, Production Tracking System Monthly Reporting,
http://www.masstech.org/IS/green_buildings/tracking.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).

Ferrey_final_cpcxns.doc

Winter 2010

2/22/2010 9:33:43 AM

FIRE AND ICE: WORLD RENEWABLE ENERGY

195

States have hung other charges for conservation or solar
398
incentive trust fund creation on the local distribution charge.
Similarly, a state could force a utility to implement a separate SBC or
create a renewable energy trust fund to reimburse the utility for
payments that the utility made above the avoided cost. However,
these renewable energy trust funds may also be susceptible to
constitutional challenges, depending on Commerce Clause issues with
their design.
States have debated the merits of feed-in tariffs, and economists
have written about the most effective and efficient feed-in tariff
399
designs. However, no one seems to have written about the potential
constitutional and statutory barriers to implementing feed-in tariffs in
the United States.
E. Key State Efforts Constitutionally Stricken: The California Cases
1. The Ninth Circuit: Independent Energy Producers
In Independent Energy Producers Association, the California
state utility commission authorized utilities to monitor QFs to
400
determine whether they met federal efficiency standards.
In
addition to allowing the monitoring, the state commission allowed the
utility to suspend payment to the QF if the utility found that the QF
401
did not comply with the federal standards.
The utility was
authorized to substitute a lower, alternative rate of only eighty
percent of the avoided cost rate in the event that it determined that
402
the QF did not comply.
CPUC’s decision was challenged and
403
appealed.
“In examining the program, the court noted that the ‘underlying
motivation behind the CPUC program [was] to lower the rates set . . .
[for independent power projects in California] standard offer
contracts because [those contracts were] higher than . . . current
avoided costs’” due to the unexpected fall of fossil fuel-fired energy
404
costs. The Court of Appeals further held that a program where the
398. See supra Part VI.C.
399. See, e.g., Lesser & Su, supra note 264.
400. See Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 853 (9th
Cir. 1994).
401. Id. at 848.
402. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 22 n.85.
403. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F.3d at 853.
404. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 22 n.85 (quoting Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F.3d at
858).
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state determined ultimate renewable energy QF status was
405
preempted by federal law. CPUC’s monitoring program authorized
states to make QF status determinations, and only the federal
406
government via FERC has that authority.
“Although the court
found that the program violated federal law by allowing utilities to
make QF status determinations, the court allowed the utilities to
continue to monitor the QFs . . . as long as the monitoring
requirements did not impose an undue burden on the facilities” or
407
their QF status.
In dicta, the court went into the details of how PURPA
408
authorizes states to calculate avoided costs.
This is where the
decision will influence and impact any future decision regarding feedin tariffs. The court stated that the rate paid by utilities for electricity
must be determined by calculating the avoided cost that the utility
would pay if it had to purchase electricity outside the QF contract
409
price. Avoided costs must be based on enumerated data regarding
the utility’s operation cost characteristics and on the availability,
usefulness, type, and reliability of the energy or capacity that is
410
purchased. QF efficiency, the court said, is entirely unrelated to the
411
utility’s avoided costs.
The court also commented that PURPA’s
412
avoided cost rates are the “statutory ceiling.”
Attempts by states to directly or indirectly promote higher
wholesale energy prices for certain renewable energy projects have
413
been stricken by the courts.
Promotion of certain types of
renewable fuels for power supply, via a price preference above and
beyond the FERC-established price of other wholesale power

405. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F.3d at 855.
406. Id.
407. Ferrey, supra note 69, at 22 n.85.
408. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F.3d at 854 nn.11 & 12.
409. Id. at 857.
410. Id.
411. Id. Given the impact that efficiency has on the electric grid, a utility would require
more capacity from lower efficiency QFs to supply an equal amount of effective generating
capacity from an equivalent capacity but higher efficiency QFs. These inefficiencies would
require more interconnection points, construction permits and contract negotiations. If a court
found efficiency outside the realm of avoided cost calculations then a court may also find some
environmental costs to be outside the realm of avoided cost despite the environmental cost
language in the San Diego G&E case cited below.
412. Id.
413. Id. (finding no separate basis for the state PUC to act to establish a premium price for
renewable low-carbon power projects).
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transactions, was found to be inconsistent with the FPA and was
414
stricken.
2. The FERC Backstop: Southern California Edison Company,
415
San Diego Gas & Electric
FERC also refused to sanction a higher California price for
416
renewable power supply. Under the filed-rate doctrine, any dispute
about these matters may not be arbitrated by the state, but is reserved
417
exclusively to federal authority. CPUC ordered two of its investorowned and regulated utilities, Southern California Edison and San
Diego Gas & Electric, to sign long-term fixed-price contracts with
QFs to purchase electricity at prices that were competitive with other
renewable energy prices, but nonetheless in excess of the utilities’
418
avoided cost.
Edison had wholesale electricity supply options
available for $0.04 per kWh or less, while CPUC required renewable
419
QF contracts as high as $0.066 per kWh.
420
The case went to FERC on challenge. FERC ruled that, under
PURPA, “states have broad powers under state law to direct the
planning and resource decisions of utilities under their jurisdictions.
States may, for example, order utilities to build renewable generators
themselves, or deny certification of other types of facilities if state law
421
so permits.”
The FERC also stated that, “assuming state law
permits, [states] may order utilities to purchase renewable
generation” as an alternative to requiring the utility to build its own
422
renewable generation.
However, the FERC made it clear that PURPA does not permit
either the FERC or the states to require a purchase rate that exceeds
423
the utilities’ avoided cost.
Avoided cost is defined as “the
incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or
both which, but for the purchase from the qualifying facility or

414. Id.
415. See S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (1995).
416. Id. ¶ 61,125 (1995) (holding the costs of renewable energy not to exceed the market or
bid price of all other sources of energy makes ratepayers indifferent as to the procurement of
wholesale power).
417. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988).
418. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (1995).
419. Id. ¶ 61,667.
420. S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,269 (1995).
421. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61.215, ¶ 61,676 (1995).
422. Id.
423. Id.
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qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or purchase
424
from another source.” The avoided cost process must reflect prices
425
available from all sources able to sell to the utility.
This concern does not ameliorate over time: The FERC further
stated that, “[a]s the electric utility industry becomes increasingly
competitive, the need to ensure that the states are using procedures
which ensure that QF rates do not exceed avoided cost becomes more
426
critical.”
This language foreshadowed the FERC EP Act of 2005
regulations removing utility QF purchasing requirements in Day 2
427
markets.
The FERC was also careful to point out that its decision did not
preclude the possibility that, in setting an avoided cost rate, a state
428
could account for environmental costs of all fuel sources.
This
language leaves open the possibility of “green pricing” options or
incentives that include RECs like those in New Mexico and
Wisconsin. Of course, a state might also otherwise reimburse a utility
for purchases above avoided costs.
3. Ninth Circuit Redux: Public Utility District No. 1 of
Snohomish County Washington
429
While
The Ninth Circuit also rendered a final key decision.
430
this decision was reworked by the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal
431
and remanded to FERC for more clarification or explanation, it was
not overturned. The Court ruled that Congress did not intend that
the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction over the interstate sale of electricity
at wholesale be determined by a case-by-case analysis of the impact of

424. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2009).
425. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, ¶ 61,666 (1995).
426. Id. ¶¶ 61,675–76.
427. See New PURPA Section 210(m) Regulations Applicable to Small Power Production
and Cogeneration Facilities, Docket No. RM06-10-001; Order No. 688-A, 119 F.E.R.C, ¶ 61,305
(2007) (order on rehearing and clarification).
428. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, ¶ 61,676 (1995).
429. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County Wash. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
430. Morgan Stanley Capital Group v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County Wash.,
th
128 S.Ct. 2733 (2008). The U.S. Supreme Court in its decision criticized the reasoning of the 9
Circuit court of Appeals decision, but nonetheless agreed with and upheld the FERC has
exclusive authority, and responsibility, to review long-term power crises, wholesale market
manipulation by a party to the power sale contract that would negate existing contract
protections, and wholesale rates.
431. Both P.U.D. No. 1 and Morgan Stanley remanded the case to the FERC. See Morgan
Stanley Capital Group, 128 S.Ct. 2733 (2008).
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state regulation on national interests.
Instead, Congress meant to
433
draw a bright line between state and federal jurisdiction. State law
is not allowed to overrule or supplant federal determinations by
434
adding requirements not consistent with those in federal law.
By exercising exclusive authority over “just and reasonable”
wholesale or interstate rates and terms, FERC ensures that wholesale
generators of electric power will charge fair rates to retailers and that
wholesale generators receive a fair rate of return, and thus have the
435
incentive to continue to produce and supply power.
The FPA
creates a “bright line” between state and federal jurisdiction, with
wholesale power sales falling clearly and unequivocally on the federal
436
side of the line.
FERC must protect the state and other
stakeholders against the state’s own contractual or regulatory actions.
Specifically, the 2000-2001 California/Western area power
shortage was significantly linked to California’s restructured power
437
market design and regulation.
When prices subsequently fell,
California attempted to be excused from the very power supply
contracts that it had forced into place with reluctant wholesale power
438
suppliers.
The state’s legal argument was that wholesale power
contracts were the exclusive province of FERC, and FERC had not
sufficiently policed the wholesale market to ensure that it functioned
439
in the public interest.
440
A majority of the Ninth Circuit affirmed this theory. FERC, as
the traditional wholesale power regulator, must protect the state (and
441
other stakeholders) against the state’s own regulatory actions.
FERC not only has exclusive authority unaffected by any state
actions over wholesale power markets, but also has an ongoing
obligation to continually monitor and police these markets against
442
state interference.
As referred to earlier, the Supreme Court
confirmed that when combined with federal preemption precedent,

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964).
Id.
Granite Rock Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985).
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1058.
Id. at 1066.
See Ferrey, supra note 17, §§ 10:17.1-9 et seq.
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1067.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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energy market regulatory reforms have contributed to “a massive
443
shift in regulatory jurisdiction from the states to the FERC.”
State law is not allowed to preempt federal determinations by
444
layering on additional requirements not contained in federal law.
The wholesale price determination is reserved exclusively to federal
445
authority.
The filed-rate doctrine extends to non-rate matters as
446
well. The FPA precludes all state regulation of interstate wholesale
447
power transactions.
From any type of generating source, moving electrons constitute
448
449
power. There is no engineering difference in the end product. It
is clear that the state can regulate non-price aspects of the power sale
450
There is mixed jurisprudence on
market within state boundaries.
how far a state can go. For example, a New York decision held that a
state cannot compel a utility to purchase power from a particular
451
wholesale source, and it also cannot attempt to determine the price
of a wholesale transaction, which is exclusively within FERC
jurisdiction. According to FERC, it “cannot ascertain . . . any legal
basis under which states have independent authority to prescribe
rates for sales by QFs at wholesale [to utilities] that exceed the
452
avoided cost cap contained in PURPA.”

443. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1064 (quoting Carmen L. Gentile, The Mobile-Sierra
Rule: Its Illustrious Past and Uncertain Future, 21 ENERGY L.J. 353, 373 (2000)); see also Entergy
La., Inc., v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003).
444. Granite Rock Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985).
445. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982).
446. The Supreme Court extends the filed-rate doctrine generally to include most aspects of
federal-state utility regulation. Moreover, the filed rate doctrine is not limited to “rates” per se:
“our inquiry is not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms of prices or volumes of
purchases.” N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 372 U.S. 84, 90–91 (1963).
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966–67 (1986).
447. Nantahala Power & Light Co., 476 U.S. at 966 (noting the “exclusive jurisdiction vested
by Congress in FERC over the regulation of wholesale utility rates”); Miss. Power & Light Co.
v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) (“FERC has exclusive authority to determine
the reasonableness of wholesale rates.”); accord Miss. Indus. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1525, 1535–49 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
448. Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: Thermodynamics, Mass
and Energy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1839, at 1908–1912.
449. See Ferrey, supra note 17, § 10:79.
450. See S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61.269 (1995)
451. Consol. Edison Co. v. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 472 N.E.2d 981, 982 (1984).
452. Conn. Light & Power Co., Docket No. EL93-55-000, 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,012, ¶ 61,029
(1995) (order granting permission for declaratory order). This case involved a QF selling to a
utility. In this opinion, FERC further articulated that if the seller was not a QF under PURPA,
the sale would still be jurisdictional to FERC based on its exclusive authority under the Federal
Power Act.

Ferrey_final_cpcxns.doc

Winter 2010

2/22/2010 9:33:43 AM

FIRE AND ICE: WORLD RENEWABLE ENERGY

201

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCLUSION
Federal case law and FERC precedent indicate that PURPA and
the FPA prevent utilities from being mandated or required to
purchase renewable energy above their avoided cost for wholesale
453
Even state feed-in tariff legislation cannot mandate a
purchases.
wholesale electric purchase at a rate per kWh above the avoided cost
454
under principles of federal preemption.
Any theoretical feed-in
tariff proposal, in order to be effective, would have to require prices
well above purchasing utilities’ avoided costs, and therefore would be
subject to a Federal Power Act challenge by ratepayers or utilities.
PURPA regulations and the FERC provide that they do not limit
the ability of parties to negotiate agreements for rates and terms
455
different from those called for in the regulations.
However, a
situation where utilities voluntarily agree to purchase power at a rate
clearly exceeding their wholesale avoided cost would also be open to
legal challenge as “imprudent” under the FPA or its PURPA
amendments by other parties, such as industry or consumer groups, if
the latter are consequently forced to pay a higher retail rate for
electricity.
Furthermore, it is unclear that voluntary utility
participation, at the utility’s own cost and risk, would provide the
long-term investment certainty desired from a feed-in tariff incentive
program.
The alternative would be to amend the FPA to allow states to
require purchase of renewable energy at rates above avoided cost.
Another option would be a federally mandated RPS or renewable
energy requirement. However, a federal renewable standard might
not result in the type of long-term prices that renewable energy
generators enjoy in Europe.
Of particular importance, the electricity rate increases associated
with existing state RPS policies are generally equal to one percent or
less so far, and thus are priced competitively with fossil fuel-fired

453. See supra note 423 and accompanying text.
454. Some commentators have suggested that if a state challenge to PURPA went to the
current US Supreme Court, it is possible, given the current justices, that PURPA would be ruled
unconstitutional in favor of greater State autonomy over electric rates. See Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 777 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that the majority was wrongly persuaded that PURPA “does not
intrude impermissibly into state sovereign functions”).
455. 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(b)(1) (2009).
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456

generation. Thus, in most states, there is not an obvious need for
higher feed-in tariffs.
Nonetheless, grafting onto American constitutional law a feed-in
tariff for renewable power, at above the typical wholesale market cost
of all power or above a purchasing utility’s avoided cost of alternative
equivalent power resources, violates existing precedent and
provisions of the FPA. This renders the European option of feed-in
tariffs legally incapable of American adaptation. Despite this, some
U.S. states are ignoring these issues and moving toward promotional
feed-in tariffs. Such actions by states (setting wholesale prices for
power sales) are preempted under the Federal Power Act and the
filed-rate doctrine as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
This leaves the RPS, as now adopted by more than half the
states, as the legally viable alternative to monetarily incentivize the
adoption of renewable power technologies for power generation by
independent power producers in the United States. Renewable
energy promotion has important implications for the control of
457
carbon emissions from the power sector, therefore it is vital to
reconcile national energy policy with constitutional requirements and
send clear signals to states.

456. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 106, at 29. Only in Massachusetts and Connecticut,
with the highest RECs trading costs, has the impact on rates of RPS exceeded 1%. Id.
457. See generally Ferrey, supra note 18.

